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WEST, JEFFREY ALLEN, Ph.D. Hypersensitivity to Threat in Paranoid 
Personality. (1988) Directed by Dr. Ira D. Turkat. 132 pp. 
Three groups of detoxified substance abuse inpatients, 
characterized by DSM-III-R criteria as Paranoid or Antisocial 
Personality Disorder, or no personality disorder, were compared in 
responses to six variations of the Stroop color-naming task designed to 
assess hypothesized attentional and discriminative aspects of paranoid 
hypersensitivity by incorporating threat and five types of non-threat 
control words as stimuli. Results supported experimental predictions 
that Paranoid Personality Disorder subjects would show greater 
differential increases in color-naming times on the Stroop task 
involving social threat words, relative to performance on tasks using 
matched non-threatening stimuli. This specific interference effect was 
not evidenced in the reponses of the non-paranoid groups. Comparison of 
performance on a subsequent recognition task indicated that Paranoid 
Personality Disorder subjects showed significant differences in ability 
to recognize previously-seen threat versus non-threat words, relative to 
remaining subjects. Signal detection analysis of results indicated that 
the Paranoid group demonstrated significantly reduced ability to 
discriminate among threat words, whereas non-paranoid comparison 
subjects tended to show maximum discriminability indices with 
threat-related material. These findings have implications for current 
formulations of paranoid disorders and personality. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
APPROVAL PAGE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES vi 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION . . 1 
Formulation and Study of PPD . . . . 6 
Overcoming Impediments To PPD Research 17 
Perception and PPD 22 
Perceptual Organization and Behavior Pathology ..... 26 
Formulation of Hypersensitivity To Threat 30 
Investigation of Hypersensitivity To Threat 35 
Comparison Groups 45 
Population ' . . 51 
Personality Assessment 52 
II. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 54 
III. METHODS 57 
Subjects 57 
Assessment Instruments 57 
Task Materials 60 
Procedure 63 
IV. RESULTS 70 
Color Naming Tasks . . . 70 
Word Recognition Task . . 78 
V. DISCUSSION 83 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 96 
APPENDIX A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONAIRE 108 
APPENDIX B. WORD RECOGNITION RESPONSE FORM 118 
iv 
APPENDIX C. SUBJECT CONSENT FORMS 121 
APPENDIX D. SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS: COLOR NAMING TASKS 124 
APPENDIX E. RECORDING FORM 126 
APPENDIX F. DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 128 
APPENDIX G. RESPONSE BIAS INDICES ACROSS WORD TYPES BY GROUP ... 130 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
TJiBLE 1. Experimental and Control Words 61 
TABLE 2. Mean Subject Demographic Characteristics and Mean 
Scores on Psychopathology Measures with 
Standard Errors by Group 65 
TABLE 3. Two-Way ANOVA: Simple Color and Conflicting Color 
Cards by Group 72 
TABLE 4. Two-Way ANOVA: Non-Positive/Gratification and 
Positive/Gratification Cards by Group 73 
TABLE 5. Two-Way ANOVA: Non-Threat and Threat Cards by Group ... 74 
TABLE 6. Two-Way MANOVA: Non-Threat, Threat, 
Non-Pleasure/Gratifiction, and Pleasure/Gratification 
Cards by Group 75 
TABLE 7. Correlations Between Color-Naming Response Times 
and Affective Distress Measures by Card Type 77 
TABLE 8. Mean Scores on Discriminability and Response Bias 
Indices by Group 80 
TABLE 9. Mean Scores on Discriminability Indices by Word Type 
and Group . 81 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
FIGURE^ 1. Mean Color-Naming Response Times for Six Word Types 
by Personality Group 71 
vii 
1 
A proliferation of clinical and research articles suggests that 
personality study is generating renewed interest (Millon, 1984). 
Attention has shifted from behavioral-consistency versus 
situational-specificity debates (e.g., compare Mischel, 1969, and 
Mischel, 1979), and new focus is directed toward investigation of 
important individual differences in behavior, particularly those 
characterizing maladaptive and dysfunctional personality styles. The 
call to analyze clinically-relevant personality phenomena has been 
joined by theorists formerly expressing little interest in this 
endeavor, including those advocating development of specific behavioral 
criteria to class so-called trait disorders and those rejecting the 
internal mediational framework of traditional personality theory 
altogether (e.g., Harzem, 1984). Researchers have directed attention to 
the lack of empirical investigation of many widely-described personality 
phenomena, and the more-carefully defined role assigned to Personality 
Disorders (PDs) in the multiaxial format of the current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III-R; 
1987) has reflected and promoted new emphases on assessment, study, and 
treatment of dysfunctional personality. In short, the field is 
experiencing enhanced interest and an expanded approach to the study of 
personality and pathology, and is beginning to address the insufficient 
empirical validation that underlies description of many of the most 
prominent or severe PDs encountered by clinicians. 
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Arguably, the most striking example of a time-preserved, 
extensively discussed, but essentially non-researched PD (c.f. Spiczer, 
1984) has primary features of pervasive and unwarranted suspiciousness, 
mistrust of people, hypersensitivity, and restricted affectivity, the 
Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD). Despite the lengthy history of the 
PPD concept and its acknowledged severity (Millon, 1981), there is a 
paucity of controlled investigation of this disorder. With limited 
recent exceptions, virtually no analysis of relevant behavior patterns 
nor account of individual differences in PPD subjects was based on more 
than clinical experience, case study, or intriguing speculation. The 
lack of systematic investigation of PPD results in part from the rarity 
with which such individuals seek treatment and the difficulty in 
obtaining data from them (Shapiro, 1965). However, despite the 
purported low incidence of treatment self-referrals, some authors 
believe PPD symptomatology to be relatively prevalent in the population 
at large (c.f., Manschreck, 1979). 
History and Description of PPD 
The concept of the paranoid personality style is long-lived. It 
was included in the 1938 U.S. Navy classification system, a precursor to 
DSM-I, and has been retained in all subsequent versions of DSM. 
Complete accounts of paranoid personality (PP) styles or characters, 
distinguished from psychotic paranoid conditions first described much 
earlier, appeared by the initial years of this century (e.g., Birnbaum, 
1909, and Bleuler, 1906, both described by Millon, 1981; Meyer, 1908). 
These accounts typically depicted personality developments considered 
premorbid antecedants for psychotic or grossly delusional disorders. 
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For example, Meyer (1908) described the following "grades of 
developments" in the emergence of "pax*anoid character": 
(a) Feelings of uneasiness, tendency to brooding, rumination and 
sensitiveness, with inability to correct the notions and to make 
concessions—paranoic constitution and paranoic moods. 
(b) Appearance of dominant notions, suspicions or ill-balanced 
aims. 
(c) False interpretations with self-reference and tendency to 
systematization (pp.256-257). 
Meyer further depicted the possible development of hallucinatory 
falsifications and megalomania in such individuals. It is apparent that 
a key feature of this description, as in other contemporaneous accounts 
(e.g., Bleuler, 1906), is the contention that PP involves an essential 
inflexibility, i.e., "excessive stability" and "inadequate realization 
of need of correction", with regard to altering behavior in response to 
personal errors or misinterpretations. Accordingly, Meyer (1908) refers 
to the paranoid character as one of "recovery without insight" (p.257). 
Kraepelin (1921) provided perhaps the classic early description of 
the paranoid style, his comprehensive account emphasizing feelings of 
distrust, uncertainty, and excessive self-valuation. The paranoid 
personality was said to ". . . feel himself on every occasion unjustly 
treated, the object of hostility, interfered with, oppressed " (p.268). 
In addition, these feelings of injustice and suspicion were said to be 
accompanied by restricted affect and irritable, discontented mood. More 
recent descriptions of PP emphasize suspicion, profoundly heightened 
sensitivity, and rigidity as essential descriptors. Tollefson (1983) 
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provides a representative characterization: 
The paranoid personality type shows a pervasive apprehension of 
others, as typified by suspiciousness, mistrust, hypersensitivity 
and a restricted affect. These individuals frequently are angry or 
guilt-ridden, and they project these feelings to their environment. 
Suspicion becomes a pronounced trait that persists despite 
contradictory evidence. The paranoid personality type loses sight 
of the "big picture" while searching intensely for rejection and 
criticism. In novel situations, the person expects bias and 
trickery or both. Interpersonal relations are limited to a few 
people; others are seen as threatening or inferior and unworthy, 
(p.216). 
Coleman, Butcher, and Carson (1984) summarize a related aspect of 
individuals with paranoid personality characteristics, that of actively 
and selectively seeking evidence of threats in their external 
environments: 
They (PPD patients) tend to see themselves as blameless, instead 
finding fault for their own mistakes and failures in others - even 
to the point of ascribing evil motives to others. Such individuals 
are constantly expecting trickery and looking for clues to validate 
their expectations, while disregarding all evidence to the contrary 
(p.237). 
These descriptions convey a sense of prevailing clinical 
impressions of paranoid personality, and highlight the central 
characteristics of PPD as defined by DSM-III, i.e., suspiciousness, 
hypersensitivity, and restricted affectivity. By definition, in a 
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paranoid personality disorder these characteristics comprise enduring 
patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment 
and self that are maladaptive and inflexible, resulting in impaired 
interpersonal/occupational functioning and subjective distress 
(DSM-III-R, 1987). The DSM-III-R Axis II gives a total of seven criteria 
for PPD. To fulfill requirements for the diagnosis, an individual's 
behavior must meet at least four of these and must not occur exclusively 
during the course of Schizophrenia or a Delusional disorder. By 
definition, a well-systemized delusional system cannot be evident. PPD 
is thus distinguished from two other disorders labelled paranoid, i.e., 
Delusional Paranoid Disorder, and Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, which 
involve gross delusions, hallucinations, or other . psychotic 
symptomatology. The relationship between these disorders is not well 
understood (DSM-III-R, 1987); indeed, the conceptualization and 
subclassification of diverse paranoid phenomena have served as foci for 
controversy over many decades (c.f., Kendler, 1980). 
DSM-III-R PPD diagnostic criteria are as follows: 
A. A pervasive and unwarranted tendency, beginning by early 
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, to interpret the 
actions of people as deliberately demeaning or threatening, as 
indicated by at least four of the following: 
(1) expects, without sufficient basis, to be exploited or harmed 
by others 
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(2) questions, without justification, the loyalty or 
trustworthiness of friends or associates 
(3) reads hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign 
remarks or events 
(4) bears grudges or is unforgiving of insults or slights 
(5) is reluctant to confide in others because of unwarranted fear 
that the information will be used against him or her 
(6) is easily slighted and quick to react with anger or to 
counterattack 
(7) questions, without justification, fidelity of spouse or 
sexual partner 
Thus, consistent with most available descriptions of paranoid 
personality styles, the DSM-III-R Axis II PPD diagnosis describes a 
chronically mistrusting and interpersonally-distant individual who is 
intensely focused on his environment, markedly sensitive to stimulus 
properties in unusual ways, and prepared to respond to any event 
perceived as threatening. 
Formulation and Study of PPD 
As stated above, published research on PP and PPD is almost 
nonexistent. Among theoreticians who have formulated accounts of the 
pathogenesis and behavioral presentation of the disorder, few have 
reported any sort of systematic empirical data base. Only two partial 
exceptions are known to this author. Millon's (1981) PPD formulation 
reportedly was derived in part from the results of extensive application 
of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI; Millon, 1982) among 
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clinical samples. This account emphasizes covariation of paranoid 
personality characteristics with other PD pathology in the majority of 
PPD individuals, and proposes an etiology of the disorder based on 
Millon's influential biosocial-learninq theory (Millon, 1969; Millon & 
Millon, 1974). Paranoid characters are seen as more severe extensions 
of certain other dysfunctional personality styles, described below, 
shown repeatedly by the MCMI to covary with PPD. Millon (1981) 
speculates that these basic personality types are particularly prone to 
decompensate into paranoid styles given the influence of certain types 
of learning histories, neuropsychological states, and/or genetic 
predispositions. 
Millon's most recent account (Millon & Everly, 1985) delineates 
three PPD subtypes in addition to the rare prototypical "pure" case. 
The paranoid-narcissistic variation develops in an individual who 
exhibits a pretentious and naively self-confident manner that provokes 
frequent challenge and ridicule from others. The extended history of 
social rejection typically experienced by such persons is said to shape 
paranoid behaviors which function to avoid punishment and salvage 
self-esteem. The paranoid-antisocial personality exhibits belligerent, 
aggressive, and interpersonally manipulative behaviors to cope with the 
threats and humiliations of an environment perceived as unrelentingly 
hostile. Such individuals are described as "drifting into persecution" 
as they become increasingly alienated and suffer progressive social 
isolation. The paranoid-compulsive PD is said to occur in chronically 
rigid, nonspontaneous, perfectionistic, moralistic individuals who come 
to assert themselves in a hostile and overcontrolling manner that 
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functions to maintain independence from others. This style is 
particularly likely to result from a history of parental overcontrol; 
such persons seek the clarity of regulations and cannot tolerate 
suspense or disorder as they desperately seek freedom from fault and 
interference. Paranoid pathology develops following real or anticipated 
reprisals against the PPD individual's inflexible and sometimes violent 
attempts to impose control on others' behavior. 
Millon (1981) also described paranoid-passive-aqgressive and 
decompensated paranoid PD subtypes. The former evidence irritable, 
negativistic affectivity and were depicted as likely products of 
chronically inconsistent parental management and contradictory 
intrafamilial relationships. These persons typically suffered severe 
emotional disappointments at home which were perpetuated in the 
environment at large when interpersonal relationships failed to develop 
or endure. Such individuals were said to be at high risk for the 
development of increasingly irrational jealousy and suspiciousness which 
can culminate in the appearance of a full-blown paranoid style. 
Finally, a severe end-stage of PPD is represented by decompensated 
paranoid PD, in which paranoid individuals who are particularly 
vulnerable to stress become easily precipitated into psychotic episodes 
involving marked fragmentation of thought and behavior. This 
deterioration may be especially striking in that its victims tend to 
have presented themselves as overly organized, intimidating, and 
dominant prior to decompensation. 
Millon, an original appointee to the Task Force on Nomenclature and 
Statistics that designed DSM-III, achieved particular impact as one of 
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the principal architects of Axis II. His formulations of dysfunctional 
personality styles including PPD have had substantial influence on 
conceptualization and assessment of these disorders by contemporary 
workers in the field and thus are deserving of review. However, 
systematic research addressing Millon's biosocial-learning theory 
applied to PPD is lacking. His hypotheses can be considered 
empirically-derived in part, in that they draw upon standardized MCMI 
testing results that identify differential patterns of covariation of 
personality characteristics upon which to base the formulation (Millon, 
1982). Unfortunately, details of this process have been insufficiently 
described. In the context of nonextant PPD research, Millon's PPD 
formulation might best be construed as a well-informed hypothetical 
model requiring experimental validation. 
Turkat and colleagues (Turkat, 1985; Turkat & Maisto, 1985) 
reported preliminary research designed to study PPD and test predictions 
derived from a general formulation of the pathogenesis of the disorder. 
Evaluative-uniqueness theory (Turkat, 1985) is based in part on case 
study of PPD individuals described by Turkat and Maisto (1985), 
including a single subject laboratory experiment involving assessment of 
electromyographic (EMG) response to criticism in a paranoid personality. 
Individual and family history data compiled from these cases suggested 
commonalities in developmental sequences and social experiences across 
PPD patients that may contribute to the emergence of the paranoid style. 
Drawing upon these data, Turkat's (1985) theory specifies five principal 
stage components in the unfolding of PPD, incorporating pathogenic early 
parental training, unusual social behaviors, subsequent social 
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isolation, and ultimate development of persecutory/grandiose ideation 
and self-perpetuating paranoid behaviors, as follows: 
(1) Parental training. By Turkat's (1985) account, parents of a 
future paranoid individual commonly emphasize themes of uniqueness and 
evaluation within the family. From an early age, their child is taught 
that he or she is special and unique compared to peers, must always be 
on guard against making mistakes, and must be prepared for others' 
critical evaluations. Everpresent concerns in the home environment 
include family secrets, social guardedness, and family-nonfamily 
distinctions. Crucially, repeated reference is made to a specific 
distinguishing attribute (e.g., appearance, intelligence, belief system, 
or background) that sets the child apart from others. Thus, he or she 
is trained to perceive and respond to others in a particularly guarded 
t 
manner even prior to encountering an extended social environment. 
(2) Acting different. The child raised in the 
evaluative-uniqueness training environment behaves differently than 
peers outside the home, exhibiting prominent social anxiety, 
ackwardness, and interpersonal suspicion. He or she soon comes to be 
discriminated by others as different and unusual, and is rejected 
socially. This tends to reinforce parental training and increase the 
individual's social apprehension. 
(3) Social isolation. As the child progresses through school and 
enters adolescence, social maladroitness and "uniqueness" - as perceived 
by child and peers - increase. Rejective social interactions 
distinguish him and increase anxiety and suspiciousness, which in turn 
invite additional rejection, often involving active attempts to 
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humiliate. His or her learning history becomes increasingly deficient 
in opportunities to acquire appropriate social interactive and coping 
skills or to consider his own behavior from another's perspective. 
Fearing further rejection and with few or no social avenues open, the 
individual withdraws. 
(4) Explanations. It is hypothesized that the hypersensitive 
individual, having achieved a status of near social isolation, is highly 
motivated to reduce anxiety engendered by the situation but has neither 
ability nor opportunity to do so by interacting with an external social 
environment. Extended periods of rumination occur, during which the 
individual attempts to account for others' hostility and his own 
isolation. An explanation consistent with .evaluative-uniqueness 
training holds that the individual is indeed different and that others 
are compelled to evaluate him critically. This explanation is 
anxiety-provoking, but can become modified to specify that external 
evaluations are negative because others are inferior and jealous. The 
implications of this conclusion, i.e., superiority of the hypersensitive 
person, are said to counteract anxiety engendered by negative 
evaluations. Thus, assumptions of grandeur and persecution become the 
"best" explanation for the isolated individual's predicament; they 
account for why people are against him, fit the data logically, are 
consistent with lifelong training patterns, and reduce anxiety. Once 
the explanatory system of PPD has developed, the characteristic paranoid 
style can be viewed as a "logical" means of interacting with a jealous, 
persecutory social environment. 
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(5) Cycle perpetuation. In the final stage described by 
evaluative-uniqueness theory, PPD behaviors perpetuate a cycle 
maintaining social isolation. The paranoid individual attends 
selectively to inappropriate cues and/or fails to respond to appropriate 
ones in the search for threat or rejection. Information is processed in 
an idiosyncratic manner consistent with the paranoid explanatory system. 
Social feedback is invariably construed as an attack, never as 
constructive. A host of suspicious and hostile interpersonal behaviors 
serve to alienate others and elicit the very responses that seem to 
confirm paranoid expectations..- In addition, the PPD individual has 
become highly vulnerable to any type of social evaluation, negative or 
positive, because criticism continues to evoke rejection anxiety and 
positive evaluation taken at face value contradicts the explanatory 
system of envious persecution. Thus, paranoid response patterns become 
highly immune to alteration or challenge, as clinical reports readily 
attest. 
Turkat (1985) has investigated certain hypotheses derived from 
evaluative-uniqueness theory. Nonclinical samples were studied 
predominantly, due to availability. Paranoid personalities were 
identified among several hundred college students by a protocol designed 
to assess the primary diagnostic characteristics required by DSM-III; 
i.e., those students scoring 1.5 standard deviations or higher above the 
mean on measures of suspiciousness (SCL-90 paranoid ideation subscale; 
Derogatis, 1975), hypersensitivity (Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; 
Watson & Friend, 1969), and restricted affect (Lazare-Klerman-Armor 
Inventory, 1970) were labelled PPs. These individuals did not 
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necessarily meet requirements for PPD, because dysfunctional aspects of 
their behavior were not assessed. Individuals scoring at least 1.5 
standard deviations below the mean on the test battery comprised 
nonparanoid comparison subjects. 
The first in a series of studies (Turkat & Banks, in press) 
demonstrated that subject groups could be distinguished on the basis of 
significantly higher self-reported frequencies of paranoid thoughts and 
paranoid experiences among PPs. This finding, which provided initial 
support for the screening battery as a valid assessment procedure, was 
replicated in a later study in which additional comparisons were made to 
clinically diagnosed subjects who met DSM-III criteria for PPD. A 
second investigation found that reported rates of paranoid thoughts and 
experiences did not differ between PP and PPD groups, but were 
significantly lower in comparison subjects. Subsequent inquiry found 
PPs to have lower rates of prior research participation and higher 
refusal rates for a proposed research project that was to include 
videotaping of participants during social interactions. These studies 
marked a promising beginning for systematic study of PP styles, 
supported predictions of evaluative uniqueness theory, and tended to 
validate the hypothesis that presence of major PPD diagnostic 
characteristics (i.e., suspiciousness, hypersensitivity, restricted 
affect) would predict relevant behavioral and developmental differences 
among samples. Of particular interest is the finding that similar 
differences occurred in clinical PPDs and nonclinical PPs. 
Recently, a second line of investigation by Turkat and his 
colleagues (Thompson-Pope & Turkat, in press) explored perceptual 
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differences among paranoid personalities. This work utilized a task 
previously employed to study paranoid differences among schizophrenics 
(McCormick & Broekema, 1978) to test a number of hypothesized response 
differences between PP, nonparanoid pathology, and normal comparison 
groups. Procedures required subjects to identify highly ambiguous 
stimuli, i.e., defocused projected photographic slides; participants 
viewed a series of ten slides of each of six animals, arranged so that -
successive slides within a series were progressively clearer and more 
recognizable. Following each presentation, subjects were instructed to 
identify the animal depicted by choosing from a list of possibilities 
(including I don't know and none of the above) and to rate their 
confidence in this decision. Targeted for investigation were latency, 
accuracy, rigidity, and efficiency of identifications, and level of 
suspicion regarding experimental procedures. 
Results indicated that, compared to normals, PPs made significantly 
earlier attempts at identification and were significantly more accurate 
in their responses to early slides in the series. PPs also appeared to 
show more confidence in their responses to ambiguous slides than other 
groups and demonstrated significantly greater loss of confidence over 
the sequence of six series. With one exception, these findings 
supported a priori hypotheses formulated by the authors on the basis of 
existing conceptualizations of PPD in the literature. The enhanced 
early accuracy of paranoid subjects ran counter to predictions. Also 
contrary to expectation, the PP group could not be distinguished on the 
basis of response rigidity defined by presence of incorrect response 
strings, or perceptual response style defined by presence of correct 
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response strings. As hypothesized, PPs did not differ from remaining 
subjects in average number of slides required to make correct 
identification, but did select "none of the above" on a significant 
larger number of trials. The latter finding can be construed as 
evidence of greater suspiciousness among the paranoid subjects regarding 
experimental procedures. 
The Thompson-Pope and Turkat (in press) study documents further 
differences in PP subjects; moreover, the inclusion of an "other 
personality" group supports the notion that at least some of these are 
specific to paranoid styles in particular rather than maladaptive 
personality traits in general. The major pattern of findings suggests 
that PPs were prone to respond more actively in difficult, highly 
ambiguous discrimination situations and, compared to other groups, were 
more likely to suspect that the correct answer was being witheld from 
the response list provided by the experimenters. PP results were also 
consistent with the hypothesis that these persons are relatively 
intolerant of ambiguity and that they tend to respond based on more 
fragmented or ambiguous information than normal controls, although this 
conclusion must be tempered by the finding that neither PP nor normal 
control groups differed significantly from "other personality" controls 
on early attempts at identification and accuracy of these attempts. 
Though PP performance was far from perfect, unlike that of normal 
controls it exceeded chance levels significantly. In addition, paranoid 
subjects appeared able to benefit from feedback and, surprisingly, did 
not evidence the response rigidity or fixed response styles attributed 
to them. 
16 
Although lacking the preliminary data-base of Millon (1981) or the 
experimental validation efforts of Turkat and associates, other 
theoretical accounts of PPD have been derived from case study of the 
paranoid character style. Most comprehensive is that of Cameron (1963, 
1974), who is well known for his pseudocommunity theory applied to 
delusional and psychotic paranoid states. Unlike many writers on 
paranoia, he distinguishes paranoid PD from delusional paranoid 
conditions. In his view, paranoid personality is a necessary but not 
sufficient precondition for development of paranoid delusions, and not 
all PPD individuals become delusional. 
According to Cameron (1963), the paranoid personality style 
originates in a history of cold, sadistic, and unreliable treatment by 
parents who may evidence suspiciousness or full-blown paranoid symptoms 
themselves. Such upbringing produces primary deficits in the future 
paranoid's repertoire including failure to trust others, reduced ability 
to tolerate suspense or novelty, and inability to shift perspective or 
respond to the environment from alternative points of view. These 
deficits severely compromise the possibility of forming appropriate 
social relationships and thereby preclude the development of adequate 
levels of self-esteem, particularly with respect to sexuality. Although 
the paranoid individual presents as emotionally controlled and 
self-sufficient, in Cameron's view he or she is secretly ashamed. 
Moreover, this person is spectacularly vulnerable to stressful 
situations that nonparanoid individuals readily cope with by means of 
interpersonal cooperation, deferred impulsivity, and assumption of 
alternative perspectives. The PPD individual becomes especially tensed 
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when exposed to social stressors and must withdraw or attack. Avoidance 
of such stressors becomes the paramount coping strategy, and leads to 
development of that exquisite sensitivity toward minute traces of 
hostility or inconsistency in others1 behaviors for which the paranoid 
personality is known. This exhaustive focus on the external environment 
promotes the final characteristic deficit, a marked hyposensitivity to 
hostile or antisocial aspects of one's own behavior. With an 
externally-directed, hypersensitive, narrowly-focused, impulsive manner 
in evidence, the PPD individual is well primed to provoke in social 
situations the interpersonal rejection or hostility that will cue 
further paranoid behavior. 
Overcoming Impediments To PPD Research 
In designing an empirical study to enhance knowledge of Paranoid PD 
it was necessary to consider special problems confronting such research 
that had discouraged investigation in the past, and to develop 
solutions. Why is more not known about PPD? Two problem areas, one 
general and one specific, seemed particularly relevant to this question. 
Accurate classification. A major impediment to systematic advance 
in understanding dysfunctional personality styles in general has been 
the failure of available classification schemes to permit accurate and 
reliable description of individual difference phenomena (Spitzer, 1984; 
Turkat & Levin, 1984). Although it is impossible to determine how much 
this problem has affected would-be PPD researchers, it undoubtedly has 
compromised systematic study of other PDs, and impacts on any proposed 
investigation of dysfunctional personality styles. The diagnostic 
systems in use until recently, i.e., the first two DSM versions, were 
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highly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of communicative, heuristic, 
and predictive value (Adams, 1981; Adams & Haber, 1984; Beaelman, 1976). 
One inherent difficulty with these nosologies was their dependence upon 
nonoperationalized units of assignment which could not be accurately or 
reliably measured, including the use of abstract, inferred psychodynamic 
concepts as diagnostic criteria. This confounded accurate description 
and classification of pathological phenomena with the limitations of 
questionable criteria used to define them. Such problems were 
particularly severe with respect to personality classification (Frances, 
1980). As a result, even those personality characteristics that over 
time have been most lavishly discussed, speculated upon, and examined in 
treatment—including PPD--have been assessed idiosyncratically and 
described inconsistently in the literature. 
Nosological classification does not itself explain phenomena; it 
identifies and describes them. Ideally, scientific classification 
schemes organize and integrate the data of a given field of knowledge in 
order to develop scientific principles and laws. Such systems comprise 
models that describe order and commonality among complex phenomena, to 
highlight important relationships among the events or individuals of 
interest and allow useful communication. This facilitates subsequent 
development of explanation, prediction, and control (Adams, Doster, & 
Calhoun, 1977). 
Adherance to a clear, reliable and valid nosology, using 
appropriate and germane assessment methods, is considered particularly 
important during the early stages of development of a data base within a 
given field, as is the case currently with PD study (Adams & Haber, 
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1984). Before analyzing personality styles, it becomes necessary to 
operationalize what will be studied. Naturalistic and ejqperimental 
observations of responses, rather then theoretical postures, arguably 
should determine the initial development of a taxonomy of behavior 
pathology (Adams et al., 1977). In this manner there is the greatest 
likelihood of identifying functionally important variables and avoiding 
the perpetuation of spurious or untestable theorizing to explain 
behavior (Adams & Haber, 1984). 
The DSM-III, adopted in 1980, was designed to address these 
concerns and offer significant improvements over its predecessors as a 
more useful nosology. Attempts were made to achieve a taxonomy that 
would be operationalized in application and free of specific theories or 
clinical orientations (DSM-III, 1980), with emphasis on reliability and 
clinical utility. Personality disorder diagnoses were formulated in 
accordance with these goals; for the most part they are constituted by 
diagnostic criteria that are potentially quantifiable and 
behavior-based, and avoid inferred causal states or etiological 
suppositions. Efforts reportedly were undertaken during development of 
the PD diagnoses to investigate and include all dysfunctional 
personality styles described in the literature in sufficient manner and 
detail to permit operationalized diagnostic criteria (Spitzer, 1984). 
For the first time, clinicians using the DSM framework code PD diagnoses 
(on Axis II) separate from major psychiatric syndromes (on Axis I). 
This system minimizes the possibility that PD diagnoses will be 
overlooked in the presence of florid Axis I conditions (Spitzer, 
Williams, & Skodol, 1980) and reflects growing awareness of the clinical 
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significance of PD classification. These trends have continued with 
further refinement in the revised DSM-III-R. 
In sum, the DSM-III PD classification system was designed to 
operationalize, delineate, and cluster in a reliable manner individual 
behavior patterns and characteristics that have been described by 
researchers and clinicians as relevant to distinct personality styles 
and disorders (Frances, 1980). Research addressing the reliability and 
validity of the Axis II system has begun to appear (e.g., Drake & 
Vaillant, 1985), although this issue remains incompletely evaluated at 
present. Given at least minimal nosological adequacy, consistent use of 
this system with appropriate assessment procedures could enhance 
significantly the potential for achieving better understanding of 
personality and related phenomena (c.f. Turkat & Levin, 1984), including 
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paranoid styles. Reliable diagnosis of PD should encourage additional 
investigation of characterologically dysfunctional behaviors found in a 
given PD class, including maladaptive cognitions, affect, perceptual 
styles, and other clinically-significant phenomena; ultimately, the 
interrelationships between these phenomena, and their functional 
relations to variables which produce and influence them, must be 
explored. 
It is obvious that none of the above have been illuminated with 
respect to PPD, because there is virtually no research on this PD. 
However, even when PD categories have been researched in the past there 
has often been little empirical basis for asserting that given 
diagnostic criteria will differentiate consistent behavior patterns 
across situations or individuals; there has been even less empirical 
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analysis of such behavior patterns per se. This highlights the need and 
opportunity for such study in many areas of personality pathology, but 
the need is particularly acute in the case of PPD because there are so 
few empirical data. The derivation of a potentially quantifiable and 
operationalizable system of behavior-related criteria from a large body 
of clinical observations and descriptions, as approximated (albeit 
imperfectly) by Axis II, can be seen as an important precurser to 
understanding differences underlying different personality styles. It 
may provide the underpinnings for a systematic and replicable program of 
study rather than an accumulation of noncomparable findings, empirical 
or otherwise. This is especially fortuitous for PPD research, which 
might avoid problems arising from the use of inferior classification 
schemes altogether. 
Obtaining subjects. Foremost among obstacles confronting PPD 
research undoubtedly has been the difficulty in obtaining a suitable 
sample of cooperative subjects. PPD cases are relatively rare among 
treatment populations (Koenigsberg, Kaplan, Gilmore & Cooper, 1985). By 
definition, the paranoid personality is guarded, suspicious, and 
intolerant of evaluative situations; obviously, persons so characterized 
may be especially likely to avoid or escape being studied, particularly 
if scrutinized in an inflexible systematic manner. Turkat and Banks (in 
press) have in fact documented that paranoid personalities are 
relativelty unlikely to participate in voluntary psychological research. 
Although there is no complete solution to the problem of subject 
recruitment, one approach is to seek paranoid individuals in large 
captive populations that are subject to evaluation irrespective of PD 
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status. This tactic, adopted by Turkat and his colleagues in studies of 
college students, can be applied to clinical populations as well. It 
has been noted (Millon, 1981) that PPD cases often come to clinical 
attention only indirectly, when they present with other problems (e.g., 
marital dysfunction, legal predicaments, substance abuse, social 
isolation). Using treatment of other problems-as a context for informed 
data collection can facilitate cooperation and lessen suspicion in these 
patients, particularly when results potentially could be useful in 
addressing treatment goals. 
Perception and PPD 
Hypersensitivity. Given availability of subjects, a suitable 
classification system, and goals of establishing that PPDs exhibit 
distinct response patterns and exploring parameters of those responses, 
discussion turns to behaviors of interest in this population. 
Particularly striking in descriptions of the paranoid style are 
consistent references to unusual perceptual responses, notably 
hypersensitive patterns that seem to relate to the hypervigilant and 
suspicious aspects of the PPD individual's behavior. Although not 
defined formally in the literature with respect to paranoid phenomena, 
perceptual hypersensitivity has been described variously as unusually 
intense, wide-ranging, automatic, or frequent attending to environmental 
stimuli, unusually high likelihood of responding to certain features of 
the environment to the exclusion of others, and unusually heightened 
sensitivity to certain aspects of the environment (i.e., low response 
threshold, or the tendency to respond to very low levels of these 
stimuli). These phenomena figure prominently in major PPD accounts. 
23 
Millon (1981) writes: 
Paranoids are constantly on guard, mobilized, and ready for any 
real or imagined threat. Whether faced with danger or not, they 
maintain a fixed level of preparedness, an alert vigilance against 
the possibility of attack and derogation. They exhibit an edgy 
tension, an abrasive irritability, and an everpresent defensive 
stance from which they can spring into action at the slightest 
offense. Their state of rigid control never seems to abate, and 
they rarely relax, ease up, or let down their guard (p.380). 
Shapiro (1965) also has described the unusually vigilant 
hypersensitive responses, particularly the focused attention, observed 
among individuals exhibiting paranoid personality characteristics: 
They are, in actual fact, extremely keen and often penetrating 
observers. They not only imagine, but also search. And they not 
only search, but also search with an intensity of attention and an 
acuteness that may easily surpass the capacity of normal attention. 
The attention of these people is, furthermore, not only 
unusually acute and intense, but also unusually active. It is . 
. an actively scanning and searching attention. Anyone who has 
come under the scrutiny of a paranoid and suspicious person is 
familiar with this quality. Nothing out of the ordinary will 
escape his attention and, certainly, nothing that is even remotely 
related to his concerns or his preoccupations of the moment (p. 
58). 
Interestingly, paranoid hyperacuity is not always associated 
exclusively with suspiciousness, and may be evident in responses across 
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a variety of situations and stimuli. Swanson, Bohnert,. & Jackson (1970) 
illustrate this with reference to an individual given an unspecified 
paranoid diagnosis: 
Sometimes this hyperalertness is directed toward nature. One 
patient suddenly noticed the fantastically beautiful reddish-golden 
color of the leaves. He described in detail how some leaves had 
taken on an almost blindingly green hue. He described birds "whose 
singing was as beautiful as Maria Callas's". (p.42). 
However, as exemplified by the above passages, most authors emphasize 
that the environmental aspects or features most subject to paranoid 
hypersensitivity and hypervigilance are those that signal threat, or are 
ambiguous and thus potentially signal threat, and attentional 
differences characterizing the PPD are said to be maximized in 
situations involving threat-related stimuli. 
Hypersensitivity to threat and related perceptual phenomena 
comprise an aspect of PP highly worthy of study. Shapiro's (1965) 
passage, above, illustrates the pervasiveness and magnitude ascribed to 
these phenomena in the literature. Descriptively, they have figured in 
most characterizations of the PPD style as one component of the more 
general hypersensitivity concept found in all modern formulations of the 
disorder, including the Axis II diagnosis. As such, they have been 
implicated in the pathogenesis of PPD by several authors, e.g., Millon's 
(1981) suggestion that hypervigilant patterns develop early on as a 
means of avoiding threat, and promote subsequent acceleration of 
paranoid patterns. Even more prominent in formulations of paranoid 
functioning is the contributory role played by hypersensitivity to 
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threat in maintaining paranoid behaviors through effects on the social 
environment, exemplified by Turkat's (1985) cycle perpetuation stage 
description. 
These hypotheses argue for more thorough investigation of 
hypersensitivity to threat in the analysis of PP. Among criteria said 
to characterize PPD, hypersensitivity phenomena appear to be 
particularly amenable to empirical quantification, an important 
consideration. Although never operationalized or researched in relation 
to personality styles, similar phenomena have been studied formally in 
other populations; findings and procedures could facilitate progress 
with respect to PDs. In addition, the richness of the phenomena may 
support numerous avenues of inquiry. 
In a more general sense, perception is a time-respected area of 
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investigation relevant to a wide variety of studied phenomena in 
psychology; thus, the linking of perceptual and clinically-relevant 
personality phenomena may add significantly to command of knowledge of 
the latter. Study of individual hypersensitivity differences could be 
expected to improve the accuracy of predicting other behavioral 
phenomena, possibly including maladaptive aspects of personality. With 
certain exceptions, however, individual perceptual differences remain 
relatively unexplored in the clinical personality literature, even in 
comparison to the limited findings that have been accumulated by 
empirical means to describe, predict, or control behaviors as a function 
of individual differences. This is particularly true with respect to 
clinically significant dysfunctional personality styles. There have been 
few systematic attempts to collect perceptual data by which to enhance 
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theory or treatment. 
Perceptual Organization and Behavior Pathology 
In addition to his etiological formulation of PPD, Cameron (1951) 
has provided challenging theoretical discussion relating perceptual 
organization to behavior pathology, particularly paranoid disorders. 
This work is not a complete or updated account of perception but is 
valuable for detailing specific types,, or classes of hypersensitive 
behaviors that may be expected to differentiate paranoid and nonparanoid 
individuals. Cameron assumes initial continuity between normal and 
pathological behaviors; that is, he postulates that all responses found 
in behavior pathology are related to and derived from normal biosocial 
behavior. Certain aspects of normal perceptual organization he 
considers especially pertinent to behavior pathology; of these, the 
following can be seen as particularly germane to formulations of 
hypersensitivity to threat. 
Exclusion-inclusion equilibrium is related to an organism's ability 
to attend and respond to only certain aspects of the environment. "The 
achievement of stability, clarity, and definiteness in perceptual 
organization, the movement from diffuseness toward precision, depends as 
much upon what is left out as upon what is admitted" (Cameron, 1951, 
p.285). Wide variability is possible; an individual may tend to include 
a myriad of inconsequential details, or may exclude even the highly 
significant stimuli that are most salient in others' perceptions. Gross 
defects thus can occur, typically leading to behavioral disruption in 
the case of overinclusion, and behavioral impoverishment, inflexibility, 
or "distortion" in the event of overexclusion. However, extremes of 
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overinclusion or overexclusion can come to serve . a defensive, or 
reactive coping, function for the pathological individual. For example, 
a person with a perceptual style that is highly inclusive initially may 
later evidence severe perceptual exclusion in reaction to the gross 
disorganization and behavioral disruption that result from the earlier 
style. 
Closely related to exclusion-inclusion equilibrium is Cameron's 
description of reaction sensitivity, by which he refers to a readiness 
or tendency to respond selectively to certain components of a 
stimulating situation and not to others. For example, a perpetually 
anxious individual will tend to perceive frightening aspects of the 
environment far more acutely than will less fearful peers. According to 
Cameron such sensitivities may be influenced by phylogeny and the 
organization of sensory mechanisms, but are particularly shaped by 
experience and the "individual need" of the organism via a sensitization 
process described below. The development of a reaction sensitivity 
represents a perceptual reorganization that has the effect of maximizing 
one kind of stimulus component while minimizing all others, even if the 
organism potentially would be able to respond to any component. 
Progressive reaction sensitization refers to the tendency of 
acquired reaction sensitivities to generalize. The individual whose 
perceptual reorganization leads to suspicion that a colleague is 
sabotaging his efforts at work, for example, may soon conclude that 
others will exhibit similar tendencies. Initial reaction sensitivities 
promote a perceptual reorganization that favors further sensitization 
along related lines. According to Cameron, this has threefold 
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significance for behavior pathology. First, it influences a given 
individual's immunity or susceptibility to behavior disorder, in that it 
affects inclusion and exclusion, and restricts the range and flexibility 
of behavior. This can lead to a relative vulnerability to development 
of pathological response patterns. Second, progressive reaction 
sensitization is operative in cumulative pathology. For instance, an 
anxious person may develop a selective tendency to respond to 
threatening aspects of the environment, and exhibit a lowered response 
threshold. This, in turn, raises the anxiety level further and renders 
the individual more susceptible to apparent danger, creating an 
escalating cycle. Third, progressive sensitization can be responsible 
for the differentiation of pathological responses into highly specific 
behavior disorders. Relatively slight initial differences in basic 
personality patterns may diverge considerably as a result of progressive 
sensitization to differing features of the environment. 
It can be appreciated that atypical exclusion-inclusion equilibrium 
and reaction sensitivity as described by Cameron seem to apply to the 
hypersensitive PPD response style as described by Axis II and clinical 
accounts. In particular, the PPD individual may be hypothesized to be 
overinclusive with respect to threatening or potentially threatening 
(e.g., unfamiliar, ambiguous) stimuli, and to exhibit pronounced 
sensitivity toward such stimuli. These conditions promote hypervigilant 
response patterns that maintain and further shape the paranoid style. 
In fact, Cameron (1951) describes an etiological role for such a process 
in the exacerbation of PPD toward more severe delusional paranoid 
states. For example, he writes: 
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Individuals whose personal inadequacies dominate their 
thinking—whether this characteristic is accessible to their 
self-reaction ("conscious") or not—are likely to perceive slights, 
insinuations, and hostility in the behavior of those around them to 
a degree that is foreign to adequate individuals. And because 
persons who are hypersensitive to the opinions of others are often 
grossly deficient in social skills, they have considerable 
difficulty in avoiding the evolution of pseudocommunities in their 
thinking. We may say of such a paranoid person that, in the areas 
of sensitivity, his hypotheses become so strong that they not only 
maximize relevant confirming information, but also tend to be 
confirmed by ambiguous, and eventually by inappropriate, 
information, (pp.287-288). 
Cameron1s notion of the pseudocommunity describes a dramatic 
developmental end point of paranoid perception that is said to involve 
the emergence of "a perceptual organization, structured in terms of the 
observed or inferred activities of actual and imagined persons, which 
makes an individual mistakenly seem to himself a focus or a significant 
part of some concerted action." (p.300). Normal individuals may 
occasionally exhibit a transitory pseudocommunity perceptual style; 
However, it represents a lasting and pervasive perceptual reorganization 
in the fully delusional paranoid state (i.e. Paranoid Disorder; 
DSM-III-R Axis I). As such, it acts as if to provide a conceptual 
framework for selective observation. A final quote from Cameron (1951) 
describes this: 
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(The pseudocommunity's) salient characteristic is that of rendering 
a person selectively reaction-sensitive by providing such a 
framework. Paranoid individuals typically grow more vigilant as 
the pseudocommunity evolves, and they notice a great many actual 
phenomena which had previously escaped their observation and that 
of other persons around them. They develop a particular way of 
perceiving their world and this determines the direction of their 
further observation, (pp.301-302). 
The relationship between PPD and the more severe paranoia 
characterized by a fully developed perceptual pseudocommunity has never 
been investigated adequately and remains unknown (DSM-III, 1980). 
Nevertheless, Cameron is not unique in proposing that these disorders 
represent different points on a continuum, with PPD a potential 
precursor for delusional paranoia (c.f., Magaro, 1980). The importance 
of the hypersensitive response style as a focus for inquiry is thus 
further supported by its hypothesized role as exacerbator of PPD 
pathology, e.g., through a process of "maximizing confirming 
information" for the paranoid individual. 
Formulation of Hypersensitivity to Threat 
The work reviewed thus far establishes the need for investigation 
of perception in paranoid personality styles and provides a basis for 
study of hypersensitive response patterns. Based upon the PP 
literature, it is proposed that the distinct perceptual hypersensitivity 
ascribed to PPD involves two interrelated but individually testable 
phenomena reflecting characteristic differences in the manner of 
attending to certain aspects of the environment, and in the nature of 
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discriminating among features of that environment. Specifically, it is 
proposed that PPDs can be differentiated from non-PP subjects as a 
function of behavioral differences reflecting enhanced attending to 
stimuli that are discriminated as threats. Support in the clinical 
literature for a significant attentional component in PPD 
hypersensitivity is well exemplified by Shapiro's (1965) contention that 
the paranoid character shows an intensity and acuteness of attention 
that surpasses normal capacities. The importance of a discriminative 
component is indicated by the consistent reports of Shapiro, Cameron, 
and others that the unusual attentional response patterns observed among 
PPDs are elicited specifically by the most threatening features of the 
environment. 
To illustrate, consider the case of subjects responding in the 
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presence of an array of stimuli, a varying proportion of which have been 
associated with threat. According to the present proposal, the PPD 
subject will tend to be distinguishable from the non-PP in this 
situation in two interrelated ways. First, the PPD will exhibit 
distinct response patterns reflecting heightened attention that are not 
noted in comparison subjects. These might include qualitative or 
quantitative differences, or both. Second, the PPD will demonstrate a 
tendency to respond differentially to threat versus nonthreat stimuli 
which is not noted in non-PP subjects under the same conditions. In 
combination, these phenomena constitute the perceptual hypersensitivity 
for which the paranoid personality is known. Thus, in the above 
situation, PPDs may show selective attention to details of threat 
stimuli, exagerated scanning for threat, differential inability to 
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ignore threat stimuli, or other attentional phenomena that are not shown 
by non-PP subjects in this context. Such perceptual distinctions are 
well explicated in Cameron's (1951) description of paranoid reaction 
precipitated by overinclusion and progressive reaction sensitivity. 
Another potential example is the distinguishing tendency ascribed by 
Tollefson (1983) to the PPD for ignoring the "big picture" while being 
"captured" by evidence of threat in unusual ways. In other situations, 
PP differences in attending to the environment may be more a matter of 
altered magnitude, duration, or frequency of behavior rather than a 
fundamentally different functional response. Profound attentional 
differences of both types among paranoid personalities have been 
discussed in detail by Cameron (1951, 1963), Millon (1981), Shapiro 
(1965), Weintraub (1981) and many others. Further, these discussions 
suggest that such individual differences in attending to stimuli may be 
discernible as an "automatic" overlearned and/or inherited perceptual 
effect that arises independently of or in advance of the subject's 
immediate verbal or cognitive control. 
The discriminative aspect of the hypersensitivity phenomena 
differentiating PPD individuals has also been illustrated in the above 
examples, in that the described attentional differences constitute 
responses having specific relations to threat stimuli. All descriptions 
reviewed have emphasized the special role of stimuli or situations that 
potentially threaten, confuse, or confound the PPD protagonist in 
eliciting the unusual perceptual phenomena that have been discussed. 
Socially-mediated threat stimuli are held to be particularly salient to 
the PP (cf. Cameron, 1963; Coleman, et al., 1984; Shapiro, 1965; 
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Tollefson, 1983). For example, Cameron (1963) highlighted the defensive 
aspects of hypersensitivity as a means of avoiding or altering threat: 
The paranoid personality is one that has its origin in a lack of 
basic trust. . .Because of his basic lack of trust in others the 
paranoid personality must be vigilant in order to safeguard himself 
against sudden deception and attack. He is exquisitely sensitive 
to traces of hostility, contempt, criticism or accusation, 
(p.645). 
Similarly, Millon (1981) summarized hypersensitive PPDs: 
"They are notoriously oversensitive and disposed to detect signs 
everywhere of trickery and deception; they are preoccupied with 
these thoughts, actively picking up minute clues, then magnifying 
and distorting them so as to confirm their worst expectations.11 (p. 
381). 
In sum, the hypothesis that hypersensitive PPDs show unique 
attentional responses to particular types of stimuli, viz., those 
signaling threat, is prominent in the clinical literature and merits 
investigation. Although distinctive hypersensitivity patterns appear to 
occur on many levels of behavior in PPDs, of particular interest is the 
possibility that these people show significant differences in the manner 
in which they initially attend to the most threatening features of the 
environment, independent of verbal instructions, task demands, or prior 
exposure to the immediate threat stimuli. Hypersensitivity of this sort 
has been demonstrated with other types of stimulus materials in non-PD 
subjects. For example, since the early studies by Cherry (1953) and 
Moray (1959) it has been recognized that most normal persons will tend 
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to respond at least some of the time to the occurrence of certain highly 
salient or strongly associated verbal stimuli (e.g., their own names) 
even when such stimuli are presented under conditions in which subjects 
do not usually attend to or discriminate the semantic features of verbal 
material (e.g., in the unattended channel of a dichotic listening task 
wherein independent auditory material is presented to each ear). Thus, 
most people demonstrate what can be called a perceptual hypersensitivity 
toward certain types of stimulus materials such as their own names. 
Following the terminology of Kahneman and Treisman (1984), for 
particular individuals specific stimulus classes can be described as 
being highly primed for attention and discrimination. Among PPD 
subjects, it is proposed that threat-related stimuli function as if they 
are so primed. Although this phenomena has not been demonstrated 
systematically or empirically in paranoid samples, and its etiological 
basis is unknown, such hypersensitivity to threat stimuli would be in 
complete accord with descriptive and clinical descriptions of PPD. 
Presumably, the hypersensitive priming of one's own name is a 
function of extended experience; however, other such priming effects 
have been shown to be subject to short-term experimental manipulation. 
For example, there is much evidence that designation of a target 
stimulus in a search task primes associated or related members of the 
stimulus class for hypersensitivity effects by the subject. As one 
illustration, subjects instructed to attend to pictures of a particular 
politician in an experiment by Bruce (1979) experienced difficulty 
(i.e., showed greater latencies) in rejecting pictures of other 
well-known political figures relative to nonpolitical stimuli; these 
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subjects demonstrated a temporary hypersensitivity to political stimuli 
as a function of the priming manipulation. Also of interest are findings 
that hypersensitivity to primed stimuli may involve non-instrumental 
responses (e.g., changes in skin conductance) that are independent of 
verbal discrimination and self-report by the subject, and can occur in 
the absence of any overt response to the stimulus even under conditions 
motivating an instrumental response (e.g., Corteen & Dunn, 1974). 
Kahneman and Treisman (1984) are among researchers who have argued that 
such priming and hypersensitivity effects reflect differential patterns 
of attending to particular stimuli in the environment, as is proposed 
here for the case of hypersensitivity to threat in PPDs. Thus, this 
formulation of paranoid hypersensitivity postulates that the unusual 
response patterns shown by PPDs in relation to threat stimuli are 
similar to other perceptual sensitivities involving nonthreatening 
material shown by non-PDs, and may be investigated using similar 
experimental procedures. 
Investigation of Hypersensitivity to Threat 
Stroop color-naming tasks. The goals of the present study are to 
verify and investigate hypersensitivity phenomena in relation to threat 
among individuals meeting criteria for PPD. To address these goals and 
to test the hypersensitivity formulation presented, it was reasoned that 
existing procedures developed for study of related phenomena in other 
populations could be applied to assess relative sensitivities to various 
stimulus types in PD samples. Selected for this purpose in the present 
study is the color-naming of emotionally salient words in an adaptation 
of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which has long been used to study 
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attentional processes. In the original version of this task, subjects 
were asked to name as rapidly as possible the color of ink in which a 
word or other stimulus was printed while attempting to ignore remaining 
aspects of the item. Stroop (1935) found that subjects took longer to 
name ink colors when items were color names that conflicted with ink 
colors than when they were rows of meaningless stimuli. Color naming was 
facilitated when items were congruent color names. Among cognitive 
theorists, a common general interpretation of this Stroop effect posits 
that interference arises and disrupts performance when cognitive 
representations of irrelevant or conflicting word contents are 
simultaneously activated and compete for processing resources, although 
there is not complete agreement about the processing stage(s) at which 
these interference effects occur (e.g., encoding versus output) nor 
whether they can be attributed to a single processing mechanism (cf. 
Seymour, 1977; Stirling, 1979). Recently, Kahneman and Treisman (1984) 
have reviewed evidence indicating that the magnitude of Stroop 
interference produced by a stimulus is proportional to the degree to 
which the stimulus is attended to by the subject. Additionally, many 
researchers have suggested that the Stroop effect derives from a 
subject's inability to focus attention exclusively on the relevant 
feature (e.g., ink color) of the stimulus (cf. Glaser & Dolt, 1977; 
Treisman, 1969). In this analysis, the magnitude of the observed Stroop 
effect reflects the degree to which other stimulus aspects (e.g. 
semantic threat associations) command attention. 
The basic Stroop interference effect has been replicated 
extensively. Although antagonistic color names tend to produce maximum 
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interference on this task, subsequent research has demonstrated that 
subjects' performance may be slowed on color-naming other types of 
stimulus materials. Klein (1964) has been cited as the first researcher 
to demonstrate that non-color words can interfere with color naming in 
proportion to their ability to command attention. For example, words 
that are associated with particular colors (e.g., grass, sky) produce 
longer response latencies compared to non-associated words (Scheibe, 
Shaver, & Carrier, 1967). More-recent experiments have indicated that 
speed of color-naming emotionally-salient words can be proportional to 
subjects' preoccupations or anxiety states. Geller & Shaver (1976) 
found that under conditions designed to increase subjects 
self-consciousness, self-relevant words were color-named more slowly 
than neutral words. Consistent with the notion that individual state or 
trait variables can interact with type of stimulus material to affect 
response times, Ray (1979) found that nonpathological test-anxious 
students in a pre-examination period were slowed on color-naming words 
related to test anxiety compared to their performance on control words, 
and this effect was proportional to the magnitude of anxiety state 
elevation. Bower (1981) and Gotlib and McCann (1984) are among other 
researchers who have demonstrated significant slowing effects of 
dysphoric and/or positive mood states on color naming of emotionally 
salient words relative to neutral words, although severe arousal states 
(e.g., as induced by amphetamines or threat of electric shock) have been 
shown to produce reduced interference effects on 
conflicting-color-naming tasks that correlate with attentional 
impairments produced by these manipulations (e.g., Agnew & Agnew, 1963; 
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Callaway, 1959). 
Several recent studies have used variations of the Stroop task to 
examine perceptual differences among clinical samples. Mathews and 
MacLeod (1985) found that generalized anxiety was associated with 
increased color-naming latencies for words related to social threat. 
Within the generalized anxiety subjects, a subgroup reporting 
predominant physical anxieties was also slowed on physical threat words. 
Williams and Broadbent (1986) compared performance of depressed patients 
who had recently attempted suicide by overdose with that of nondepressed 
matched controls on color naming of neutral, "negatively-toned" (i.e., 
depression related), and suicide-specific word types. All groups showed 
greater latencies with non-neutral word types, but the extent of slowing 
was greatest for overdose subjects on suicide-related words. Watts, 
McKenna, Sharrock, and Trezise (1986) tested spider phobics and 
non-phobic controls on several versions of the Stroop task and found 
that phobics evidenced severe retardation on color-naming spider words 
but not more general threat words or conflicting-color names. 
Interestingly, subsequent desensitization of the phobic subjects 
significantly reduced their color naming latencies on the spider word 
task. Although results indicated a highly specific Stroop effect 
interaction between phobic status and word type, the standard 
conflicting-color-naming effect was virtually identical in phobics and 
normals, demonstrating that Stroop-type tasks can detect and quantify 
highly specific individual differences in susceptibility to interference 
by particular stimulus types. 
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These findings support the proposal that Stroop task performance 
can provide a sensitive measure of individual differences in response 
to particular stimulus classes (e.g., threat stimuli) having 
relevance within the context of specific types of psychopathology. 
Hypersensitivity can be operationally defined in such tasks as the 
degree of interference (i.e., increased latency) in color naming members 
of the target class relative to nonmembers that are matched on other 
characteristics such as length and average frequency of occurrence in 
popular media (hereafter referred to as frequency). An additional 
benefit of the Stroop task for this purpose is its comparative lack of 
confounding demand characteristics and the reactivity effects that can 
affect self-report measures (cf. Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
Accordingly, this study used Stroop tasks involving the color naming of 
threat and various types of nonthreat words by independently-defined PPD 
and non-PPD subjects. The nonthreat words included conflicting color 
names to assess possible differences in susceptibility to the basic 
Stroop effect across groups, neutral words matched on length and 
frequency to the threat words to serve as control stimuli, and positive 
or appetitive words with matched neutral controls, to assess the effects 
of a semantically- and emotionally-related but non-threat-related 
stimulus set on color-naming performance. It was hypothesized that PPD 
subjects, as a function of their hypersensitivity (i.e., enhanced 
discriminating and attending) to threatening aspects of the environment, 
would show greater interference effects than would non-PPD subjects when 
color naming threat-associated words compared to matched nonthreat 
stimuli. That is, an interaction between stimulus type and subject 
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diagnosis was predicted such that PPDs would show greater differential 
increases in response times on the Stroop task involving threat words. 
Word recognition test. To extend the investigation of 
hypersensitivity effects assessed in the color naming tasks, this study 
also included a word recognition test presented immediately following 
completion of the final Stroop. This test incorporated all of the word 
stimuli included on the prior color-naming tasks (i.e., old words), 
interspersed with an equal number of new distractor words that had not 
been seen during the prior procedures, matched to old words on semantic 
content (threat/positive/neutral), frequency, and length parameters. 
Thus, this recognition task assessed the accuracy with which subjects 
could discriminate the stimuli of the Stroop tasks from matched 
distractors following a short time interval. It constituted a test of 
incidental memory in that subjects were not informed beforehand that 
they would be required to identify the original words. The test was 
constructed in a manner permitting the application of Signal Detection 
Theory (SDT) analysis to derive an index of subjects' recognition 
sensitivity independent of any response bias or overall tendency toward 
reporting words as old or new. It was hypothesized that PPD subjects 
would show significant differences on this recognition test as a 
function of their hypersensitivity to the threat stimuli presented 
during the color-naming tasks. In addition to comprising an independent 
validation of PPD hypersensitivity to threat, it was reasoned that such 
differences could potentially allow additional analysis of significant 
Stroop task results. 
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Two predicted differences in recognition performance by PPDs were 
derived from the notion that these subjects would evidence enhanced 
attending to threat stimuli presented during the color-naming tasks. 
The differences involved overall recognition sensitivity (i.e., for all 
old versus new words), which was predicted to be significantly decreased 
in PPDs relative to non-PPDs, and specific recognition sensitivity for 
threat words, which was predicted to be significantly increased in PPDs 
compared to control subjects, and relative to PPD recognition for 
non-threat words. These specific predictions followed from the general 
hypothesis that, across subject and stimulus types, paranoid subjects 
attend most acutely to threat stimuli. A variety of evidence suggests 
that increased attending to given stimuli will promote enhanced 
recognition of that material upon subsequent testing (cf. Craik & 
« 
Jacoby, 1979; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Mandler, 1975; Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980). This is consistent with theoretical accounts such as 
Craik and Lockhart's (1972) proposal that a record of the perceptual 
analyses of stimuli is made in memory, with the depth of a continuum of 
processing determining how and what can be remembered; e.g., the 
"deeper" semantic processing allowed by hypersensitive attending to 
threat stimuli may enable more effective encoding and retrieval of this 
material (cf. Schulman, 1971). Thus, it was hypothesized that PPDs 
would show maximum recognition sensitivity for threat words, relative to 
other stimuli, and that this would be significantly greater than that 
shown by comparison subjects. 
The second prediction that was advanced based on existing 
experimental literature maintained that PPDs would show significantly 
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decreased recognition sensitivity overall, i.e., for all old versus new 
words, as a function of hypersensitivity to the threat stimuli. This 
hypothesis followed from the supposition that enhanced attending to 
threat stimuli would decrease or disrupt attention directed toward 
non-threat words during the initial Stroop tasks. Such an effect has 
been demonstrated, albeit with much shorter exposure times, in an 
experiment by Erdelyi and Appelbaum (1973). These investigators found 
that recognition sensitivity for eight briefly presented neutral visual 
stimuli was significantly decreased among members of the Rutgers Hillel 
Foundation (a Jewish organization) when the stimulus configuration also 
included a swastika or Star of David (both highly primed stimuli for 
these subjects) relative to a neutral configuration. Subsequent work in 
this laboratory extended demonstrations of such phenomena (called 
cognitive masking by these authors) with sequentially presented visual 
stimuli (Erdelyi & Blumenthal, 1973), and similar effects have also been 
reported in experiments presenting primed verbal material before or 
after neutral words (e.g., Tulving, 1969). Erdelyi and Blumenthal 
(1973) conceptualize these findings as reflecting reduced attending to 
neutral stimuli presented in physical or temporal proximity to primed 
material. In the present experiment, it was hypothesized that an 
analogous effect would occur in the word recognition task in those 
subjects showing hypersensitivity to threat stimuli. The hypothesized 
net effect of reduced attention directed toward the nonthreat stimuli 
among PPDs was inferior recognition sensitivity overall for old words in 
these subjects, despite the predicted enhancement of their recall for 
the minority of words that were threat-related. 
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As stated earlier, it was possible to quantify the sensitivity and 
response bias aspects of recognition performance in this experiment 
through the use of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) methodology, which has 
been developed to allow computation of separate indices for the two 
parameters in a variety of applications. In the most general case, the 
SDT index of discriminability measures the accuracy with which an 
individual distinguishes among stimuli of varying intensities; high 
values indicate high accuracy. In a variety of types of tasks, this 
index of perceptual performance has been shown to be little influenced 
by attitudinal or motivational variables; rather, it typically is 
considered to be related to relevant cognitive functioning and stimulus 
parameters. The second index of perceptual performance, the report 
criterion, measures the readiness or tendency of a subject to use a 
particular response. A relatively high criterion reflects decreased 
tendency to emit a given response; a low criterion indicates that a 
subject readily emits the response. This index generally has been 
conceptualized as reflecting influence of attitudinal, motivational, 
learning, and situational variables. 
The general experimental paradigm for an SDT perceptual experiment 
involves two classes of stimulus events varying on some dimension and 
having fixed a priori occurrence probability. The subject is instructed 
to make a forced-choice response indicating which stimulus event 
occurred, e.g., signal versus no signal, or previously-seen versus new 
stimulus. This situation generates a 2 X 2 stimulus-response matrix 
exhausting the following four possible stimulus-response contingencies: 
(1) actual signal and "signal" response (a hit); (2) actual signal and 
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"no signal" response (a miss); (3) no actual signal and "signal" 
response (a false positive); and (4) no actual signal and "no signal" 
response (a correct rejection). However, for a complete description of 
the subject's performance, an estimate of the variation in the subject's 
response criterion must also be obtained. This can be obtained if the 
subject is instructed to make a confidence rating of his or her accuracy 
on each trial. A rating of high confidence is assumed to correspond to 
a strict criterion for a given response class, and a low confidence 
rating is assumed to correspond to a less stringent criterion (Price, 
1966). 
In the pioneering application of SDT to the study of verbal 
retention (Egan, 1958), groups were administered learning trials on a 
list of verbal stimuli. When these stimuli subsequently were 
readministered mixed with new items, subjects were required to indicate 
original items and provide confidence ratings for each decision. 
Recognition scores and confidence ratings obtained in this experiment, 
in conjunction with false alarm (i.e., false recognition) and correct 
rejection rates, enabled the calculation of SDT indices that proved 
vastly superior for measuring recognition-memory performance than 
procedures previously in common use. 
For a comprehensive explication of SDT as applied to memory-related 
tasks, the reader is referred to Banks (1970). However, a brief summary 
will be presented here. A traditional approach to the application of 
SDT to memory posits the existence of a memory trace that a subject can 
potentially detect and respond to as a signal. However, such signals do 
not present in isolation; rather, they always occur in the presence of 
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noise. Sensory input (i.e. of signal plus noise) is assumed to vary 
continuously and randomly about one mean value for the signal. Given 
the occurrence of a "weak" signal, e.g., one which is not readily 
discriminable from the "noise" generated by similar new items in the 
recognition task under consideration, the observer's response might be 
inaccurate because of limitations in absolute ability to detect or 
discriminate the trace. Alternately, the person might respond 
inaccurately because he or she is overcautious and reports only those 
traces that are maximally discriminable from noise. SDT enables 
separate quantification of these two processes: detection and reporting 
bias. In the present experiment SDT procedures allowed independent 
measurement of sensitivity and response bias parameters. This 
represents one of the first times that SDT analysis has been applied to 
DSM-III-R PD-related phenomena. 
Comparison groups 
Analysis of hypothesized hypersensitivity differences in PPDs 
required quantification in relation to the performance of other, non-PPD 
individuals. In selecting appropriate comparison samples for the 
proposed study, several considerations were accorded importance. First, 
all subject groups were matched as closely as possible on non-PD 
variables to minimize confounding effects by other factors. Second, 
comparison groups included other PDs to permit evaluation of 
hypersensitivity to threat and paranoid characteristics distinct from 
more common aspects of PDs in general, e.g., maladaptive functioning, 
subjective distress. Third, comparisons also included non-PD 
individuals, to permit evaluation of hypersensitivity and paranoid 
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characteristics in relation to nonpathological personality. 
These considerations were addressed in this study by utilizing a 
PPD sample and two comparison groups drawn from a common population. 
The comparison groups included individuals who met Axis II criteria for 
diagnosis of Antisocial PD (APD), and individuals who did not meet 
criteria for any Axis II disorder, respectively. Thus, PPD 
hypersensitivity to threat was studied in relation to response styles of 
both PD and non-PD subjects. Among Axis II PDs, APD was selected for 
comparative study on the basis of clinical and experimental data 
suggesting that such individuals, though capable of acute perceptual 
performance under certain conditions, would not exhibit the 
hypersensitive behaviors hypothesized to be fundamental in PPD. Because 
individuals meeting DSM-III-R criteria for APD were readily available 
t 
and could be assessed reliably (Brantley & Sutker, 1984; Hare, 1985), 
APD subjects comprised a response sample that was practical and suitable 
for comparative testing of hypersensitivity in PPDs while controlling 
for more general effects of personality disorder as defined by 
DSM-III-R. 
In contrast to most previous diagnostic schemes for APD, Axis II 
criteria are operationalized in relation to overt behavior and make 
reference to a history of parental irresponsibility, erratic employment 
and work-related behaviors, lawbreaking, inability to maintain long-term 
attachments to sexual partners, repeated physical assaults, and other 
reckless activity. Such characteristics are said to suggest "history of 
continuous and chronic antisocial behavior in which the rights of others 
are violated" (DSM-III, 1980). This exclusive emphasis on overt 
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antisocial behavior patterns has proven to be highly controversial, nc: 
only for those disdaining the lack of psychodynamic and etiological 
information (e.g., Vaillant, 1984) but also for the many clinical 
investigators who view APD as involving important additional cognitive, 
perceptual, or other behavior patterns rather than lawbreaking and 
interpersonal violation alone (c.f. Brantley & Sutker, 1984). 
Researchers have investigated such phenomena in variously-diagnosed APD 
samples; there is a need now to extend these findings in a 
systematically-defined population and to examine their relationship with 
antisocial behavior patterns such as those comprising the diagnostic 
criteria of APD in DSM-III-R. 
The notion of a personality style defined by antisocial 
characteristics (often referred to as sociopathy, or sometimes 
psychopathy), usually thought to include poor ethical development, 
apparent inability to follow socially-sanctioned models of behavior, and 
limited capability for loyalty or emotional involvement with others, has 
been discussed by clinicians for many years. Although there has been 
disagreement concerning the best manner in which sociopathy may be 
conceptualized and described (Brantley & Sutker, 1984), survey data 
suggest that a large number of clinicians do report the concept to be 
meaningful and useful (Gray & Hutchison, 1964). APD represents the 
best-researched Axis II category by far; investigators have studied 
hypothesized behavioral features including sensation-seeking, deficits 
in avoidance learning, inability to delay reinforcement, and performance 
in choice situations, among many others (Brantley & Sutker, 1984; Hare & 
Schalling, 1978). Without attempting thorough review of the wealth of 
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APD research findings, prominent description and formulation of the 
concept will be considered in brief. 
Probably the most influential and comprehensive description of 
antisocial personality (AP) has been that provided by Cleckley since 
1941 in five editions of The Mask of Sanity (5th edition, 1976). Of 
several possible exemplars, Cleckley's work comprises the classic 
portrait of the AP and serves to illustrate clinical impressions of APD 
phenomena. Although Cleckley presents detailed description and 
interpretation of behavior without experimental support, his work is 
particularly noteworthy because experimenters have subsequently explored 
hypotheses derived from almost every aspect of his descriptions. Among 
the most influential has been his assertion that the primary sociopath 
exists within a severely restricted range of affective arousal, and that 
this emotional attenuation results in a relative inability to learn from 
experience. 
On the basis of extensive clinical exposure, Cleckley detailed the 
following 16 main features that were said to define and describe the 
sociopath: superficial charm and good intelligence; absence of delusions 
and other signs of irrational thinking; absence of "nervousness"; 
unreliability; insincerity; lack of remorse; poor judgement; 
insufficiently motivated antisocial behavior; pathological egocentricity 
and incapacity for love; general poverty in major affective reactions; 
"specific lack of insight"; lack of responsiveness in interpersonal 
relations; uninviting behavior with and sometimes without intoxication; 
low risk of suicide; impersonal sex life; and failure to follow a life 
plan. To the extent that some of these features are positive or 
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adaptive, sociopathy cannot be considered simply a manifestation of 
disturbed or deficient functioning (c.f. Sutker, Moan, & Allain, 1974). 
According to Cleckley, the overriding characteristic of the sociopathic 
personality is an inability to experience the affective components of 
personal and interpersonal behavior. This produces selective learning 
deficits with complications of the incomplete socialization, failure to 
profit from experience, and various maladaptive behavior patterns said 
to characterize the sociopath. 
Many early formulations of APD drawn from clinical experience, in 
similar fashion to that of Cleckley (1976), hypothesized that sociopaths 
are inherently deficient in ability to acquire learned responses. For 
example, Eysenck (1964) described them as poor learners who extinguish 
more rapidly than non-APD individuals. Such contentions are relevant to 
hypothesized performance differences in APDs on the hypersensitivity 
tasks, particularly if a geheralized learning deficit is involved. Quay 
(1965) speculated that sociopaths require higher and more variable 
levels of stimulation to maintain positive affect. Specifically, he 
hypothesized that more intense sensory input is necessary to induce 
pleasure in such persons, and that they adapt more quickly to steady 
states of stimulation and thus require more rapid and changeable input. 
These characteristics were said to produce relative deficits in ability 
to aquire new responses in learning situations. Many studies have 
investigated aspects of this notion, with mixed results (Brantley & 
Sutker, 1984; Hare & Schalling, 1978). In certain situations, 
sociopaths have demonstrated relative inability to learn well from 
experience. For example, compared to controls, they have shown inferior 
50 
performance on tasks involving classical conditioning and generalization 
(Hare, 1965; Hare & Quinn, 1971), avoidance learning (Lykken, 1957), and 
verbal conditioning (Quay & Hunt, 1965; Stewart, 1972). Widom (1976) 
found that anxious sociopaths showed significantly less ability than did 
normals to tolerate monotonous tasks. On the other hand, a number of 
studies have examined learning situations in which performance of APDs 
was not deficient relative to non-APDs, including verbal conditioning 
with social reinforcement (Bryan & Kapche, 1967), social learning (e.g., 
Kadlub, 1956), and certain types of paired-associate learning (Sutker, 
Gil, & Sutker, 1971). 
These and many other studies have established that individuals 
characterized as sociopathic do show comparatively inferior performance 
on certain types of learning tasks, but it is apparent that such 
individuals are not necessarily deficient in acquiring learned responses 
in general. In their recent comprehensive review of the research 
literature on antisocial behavior disorders, Brantley and Sutker (1984) 
concluded that sociopaths respond idiosyncratically or differently from 
most nonsociopathic individuals on learning tasks. It appears that 
certain variables affect learning-related behaviors differentially in 
APDs, and these can lead to performance that is equivalent or superior 
to that of control subjects. For example, learning in sociopaths has 
been shown to be improved by use of primary reinforcers (Painting, 1961) 
and/or monetary rewards (Schmauk, 1970) as opposed to social 
consequences, by the elimination of any time delay between the 
completion of a response and the onset of reinforcement (e.g., Gullick, 
Sutker, & Adams, 1976), and by the use of opposite-sex experimenters 
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(e.g., Stewart & Resnick, 1970). These variables may influence 
performance of controls, but they appear to be especially powerful in 
modifying behavior of APDs. The latter often show poor performance 
under conditions that produce competent learning in normals. 
The mechanisms of such differences in APDs remain imperfectly 
understood. Controversy abounds, for example, over the existence and 
role of possible neurological correlates (Elliott, 1978). Although the 
phenomena addressed in the proposed investigation have not been studied 
in this population, the available literature suggested that APD subjects 
would not demonstrate hypersensitivity to threat as operationalized in 
the experimental tasks. 
Population 
The target population selected for the proposed study was that of 
hospitalized, abstinent alcohol and drug abusers. This population 
offered the advantages of inpatient samples as discussed previously. 
Primary substance abuse is a prevalent reason for inpatient admissions, 
and large proportions of alcohol and drug abusers receive PD diagnoses. 
For example, it has been estimated that 70-90% of substance abusers meet 
criteria for at least one PD category (Kosten, Rounsaville, & Kleber, 
1982). A recent study of 2,462 patients seen at the New York 
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center for psychiatric evaluation revealed that 
substance use disorders were the most likely Axis I labels to be 
associated with Axis II disorders (Koenigsberg, et al., 1985). Although 
PPD cases are relatively rare, substance abusers have been shown to be 
heterogeneous with respect to personality disturbance with no one type 
of PD predominating (Cox, 1984; Owen & Butcher, 1979; Sutker & Archer, 
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1984). Beyond the practical advantages of studying this population, 
utility of DSM-III PD classification for substance abusers is a topic of 
considerable interest in its own right, as exemplified by a recent 
literature review reporting over 1500 articles on relationships between 
personality and substance abuse phenomena (Cox, 1984). 
Personality Assessment 
Methodological problems related to personality assessment required 
particular consideration in addressing the research goals of this 
project. Recent discussions in the literature have highlighted 
potential pitfalls in obtaining accurate diagnostic data by interview, 
including nonsystematic self-report data review, conflicting notions of 
primary or essential symptoms, and rater inexperience (Spitzer, Endicott 
& Robins, 1978; Strober, Green & Calson, 1981). The problem of 
obtaining valid self-report information is particularly complex with a 
substance abuse population. Lack of insight, perceptual distortions, 
and chronic lying among drug and alcohol abusers are problematic for 
assessment, and variables associated with transitory drug effects, 
changing mood states, retrospective reporting, and demand 
characteristics of the treatment environment may serve to compromise the 
validity of self-report data. For example, it is well documented that 
self-reported personality traits vary as a function of intoxication and 
anxiety state (Owen & Butcher, 1979). To enhance validity and 
reliability of data in the proposed study, the design included 
semi-structured interviews with patients. These procedures were 
designed to facilitate consistent data collection from converging 
sources, for improved reliability and validity relative to previously 
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used methods such as simple assignment by intake diagnosis. 
Related methodological problems specific to Axis II also arose. In 
that PDs are conceptualized as enduring and pervasive, their assessment 
at a discrete point may be considered inadequate. From a methodological 
perpective, more extended observation offered advantages in the 
assessment of enduring personality features, particularly in comparison 
to intake data. For instance, upon admission to an inpatient program, 
substance abusers often show exaggerated symptoms associated with drug 
effects and lifestyle complications. Observation over time offered one 
mechanism to help separate transient characteristics from those that are 
more pervasive. In the present study, PD diagnosis was based on repeated 
patient observation during inpatient stay, with two weeks of monitoring 
preceding administration of the PD diagnostic interview. This allowed 
sufficient time for dissipation of acute drug-related effects and for 
collecting background and behavioral data, to enhance the likelihood of 
eliciting representative interview data. It also permitted the more 
anxious, depressed or guarded patients to become acclimated to treatment 
demands and desensitized to the interview. The proposed methodology was 
consistent with recommendations that diagnostic evaluation should not be 
limited to a single examination at one point in time and should 
incorporate all data sources uniformly available (Blashfield & Draguns, 
1976; Spitzer, 1983). 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This research project was designed to represent an exploration of 
characteristic response patterns involving hypersensitivity to threat, 
with comparisons between subject groups defined on the basis of Paranoid 
and Antisocial Personality Disorders and a group defined by the absence 
of personality disorder. It was intended to address one gap in 
empirically-derived knowledge related to the description, prediction, 
and modification of behaviors of individuals meeting PPD diagnostic 
criteria, to extend the findings related to perceptual phenomena among 
the more frequently studied APD group, and to compare findings for these 
groups with those for a non-personality-disordered control sample. The 
study involved investigation of unique features of different 
dysfunctional personality styles and comparison of dysfunctional and 
nondysfunctional individuals. A primary goal was to expand knowledge of 
one of the most salient and characteristic—but completely 
unstudied—aspects of behavior styles ascribed to PPDs. It can be noted 
also that certain aspects of pathological personality styles, possibly 
including perceptual differences, may in fact be adaptive in certain 
situations (c.f., Brantley & Sutker, 1984; Sutker, Moan, & Allain, 
1974). Study of hypersensitivity therefore might eventually contribute 
to an analysis of ways in which factors interact to produce response 
styles seen as pathological versus those considered adaptive under a 
given set of conditions. 
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The foregoing considerations comprised the rationale underlying 
this research. The specific aim of the investigation was to compare 
responses of three groups of men on a series of six Stroop tasks. Two of 
the groups contained individuals exhibiting significant Paranoid or 
Antisocial Personality Disorder characteristics, respectively. The 
third group consisted of subjects who do not meet criteria for any 
personality disorder. The Stroop tasks were designed to assess 
hypothesized attentional and discriminative aspects of PPD 
hypersensitivity by incorporating threat and five types of non-threat 
control words as stimuli, including words selected on the basis of 
strong positive and/or appetitive associations. The latter provided a 
verbal stimulus set intended to be maximally salient for APD subjects. 
It was hypothesized that PPD subjects would show greater interference 
effects than would non-PPD subjects when responding to threat words, 
compared to matched' nonthreat stimuli, on the Stroop tasks. That is, 
there would be an interaction between stimulus type and subject 
diagnosis such that PPDs would show greater differential increases in 
response times on the Stroop task involving threat words. A secondary 
hypothesis predicted similar interference effects among APD subjects 
color-naming positive words. However, on the basis of research findings 
indicating relatively poor control of APD responding by verbal stimuli, 
it was predicted that effects of positive words on APD color naming 
would be of lesser magnitude than those produced by threat stimuli among 
PPDs. 
It was also hypothesized that PPD performance on a recognition task 
involving all stimuli presented on the four experimental word set Stroop 
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tasks and an equal number of matched distractor stimuli would differ in 
reliable ways from that of non-PPD groups. In particular, it was 
predicted that recognition sensitivity for threat stimuli (i.e., the 
ability to discriminate previously-seen threat words from threat 
distractors) would be significantly increased in hypersensitive PPDs 
relative to other subject groups, and would be maximized relative to 
recognition for other stimulus classes in PPDs. That is, it was 
hypothesized that discrimination of old from new threat words would be 
differentially enhanced in PPD subjects exhibiting hypersensitivity to 
threat. An analogous effect of lesser magnitude was hypothesized in 
APDs on recognition for positive words. A final hypothesis maintained 
that PPDs would show significantly decreased recognition sensitivity 
overall, i.e., for all old versus new words, as a function of 
t 
hypersensitivity to the threat stimuli. 
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METHODS 
Subjects 
The potential subject pool included 192 male inpatients admitted 
consecutively to the Drug Dependence Treatment Unit (DDTU) at the 
Veterans Administration Medical Center, New Orleans (NOVAMC), over a 
six-month period. Following routine psychological and social history 
assessment, veterans meeting criteria for study inclusion were recruited 
individually and requested to participate in a psychology research 
investigation in addition to regular assessment procedures. Thirty-eight 
volunteers completed study procedures and comprised the experimental 
sample. No subject was maintained on methadone or psychotropic 
medications, and none showed evidence of Organic Brain Dysfunction, 
Major Depression, or Schizophrenic Disorder, using DSM-III-R criteria. 
All cooperated throughout administration of paper-and-pencil 
instruments, structured interviews, and the color naming and word 
recognition tasks. Subjects were predominantly Black (89%), ranged in 
age from 25 to 43 years, and reported a mean formal grade achievement of 
12.2 years. These men were primarily abusers of illicit drugs, with 
cocaine (66%) and heroin (21%) most frequently reported as their drug of 
choice. 
Assessment Instruments 
Personality assessment. Axis II diagnoses were derived using the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R Personality (SCID-II: 
Spitzer & Williams, 1986). Currently the only comprehensive DSM-III-R 
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personality instrument (c.f. Reich, in press), the SCID-II was designed 
by a principal author of Axis II to facilitate rapid and valid 
assessment of all PD criteria, and closely follows DSM-III-R decision 
rules. It offers a procedural focus on usual rather than acute or 
hospital-related behavior, a scoring system based upon behavior patterns 
that have predominated during recent years, and a screening questionaire 
and skip-out instructions that enable the interviewer to focus upon 
behaviors that are diagnostically relevant. Use of SCID-II to measure PD 
symptomatology for treatment and research has been endorsed by several 
reviewers as an improvement over alternative diagnostic procedures 
(Mackinnon & Yudofsky, 1986; Reich, in press). Although the most 
thorough psychometric evaluations of this recently-developed assessment 
tool and its companion for Axis I diagnoses, the SCID, are ongoing at 
the time of writing and remain unpublished, emergent empirical reports 
(e.g., Riskind, Beck, Berchick, Brown, & Steer, in press) have confirmed 
the potential of these instruments to differentiate selected DSM-III 
disorders reliably. As part of routine assessment on DDTU at the 
NOVAMC, the SCID-II has been administered to several hundred inpatients 
and has shown excellent utility and reliability. Results of a recent 
study of 165 DDTU inpatients that was designed to test internal 
consistency of DSM-III-R Antisocial and Borderline PD criteria confirmed 
that the SCID-II was used reliably across raters to diagnose these 
disorders, with Kappa values ranging from .71 to .97 for individual 
Antisocial PD criteria (Malow, Donnely, West, & Sutker, 1987). 
Clinical assessment. Demographic, family background, substance 
abuse history, physical health, and social/economic functioning data 
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were collected during semi-structured individual interviews of subjects 
by psychology staff assigned to DDTU, using the Background Information 
Questionaire (BIQ) currently in use at the NOVAMC (see Appendix A). This 
instrument was developed particularly for use with inpatient substance 
m 
abusers and has been utilized continuously on DDTU to complete 
background assessment of more than 1500 inpatients. To confirm the 
validity of PD group assignments, selected domains of current 
psychopathology including anxiety states, depression, social 
nonconformity, paranoid ideation, and social introversion were assessed 
with appropriate scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI; Dahlstrom, Welsh & Dahlstrom, 1972), the A-State 
portion of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Form X (STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The MMPI is the most 
frequently employed instrument for describing personality 
characteristics and psychopathology among substance abusers, offering 
specialized scale content of particular relevance both to drug use (Cox, 
1984; Sutker & Archer, 1979; Owen & Butcher, 1979) and sociopathy (Hare 
& Schalling, 1978). The STAI and Beck are widely used paper-and-pencil 
instruments for assessment of anxiety and depressive states, with 
abundant normative data available (e.g., Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 
1970). Intellectual functioning was estimated by the Shipley Institute 
of Living Scale (Shipley, 1967), a popular screening instrument that 
estimates abilites both in verbal and nonverbal performance areas. 
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Task Materials 
Materials used in the color naming tasks consisted of six large 
(24cm X 38cm) white cards laminated in clear plastic, each card 
containing 96 words drawn from one of the six stimulus sets (i.e., 
threat, non-threat, positive/gratification, non-positive/gratification, 
simple color, and conflicting color) described below. Each set of 12 
words was printed on a single card a total of eight times, arranged into 
12 rows of 8 words on the card face, the set being presented in a new 
random order each of the eight times. Thus, one card containing 
repeated instances of all items in a given stimulus set was generated 
for each of six color-naming tasks. Words were computer printed in 
0.5cm block capitols in either red, green, blue, or orange ink. Color 
order was random within a card with the constraint that each color 
appeared twice in each row. In the conflicting color set, ink color was 
never consistent with word content. 
Threat stimuli. Nine of the 12 threat words in this study were 
selected from the Social Threat stimuli used by Matthews and MacLeod 
(1985). To minimize problems related to possible vocabulary limitations 
in the present subject sample, three relatively infrequent words used by 
those researchers (e.g., inept; Standard Frequency Index, SFI, = 36.1; 
Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971) were not included in the current 
study. As replacements, three more-frequent words (tricked, cheating, 
unintelligent) appearing in descriptions of PPD hypersensitivity by 
Millon and Cameron were used. See Table 1 for all word lists. 
Positive/gratification stimuli. Six words were chosen from 
positive adjectives endorsed by 85% or more of all APDs examined by 
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Table 1 
Experimental and Control Words 
Threat Non-Threat 
PATHETIC 
TRICKED 
FOOLISH 
LONELY 
INFERIOR 
CRITICIZED 
CHEATING 
HATED 
INADEQUATE 
STUPID 
FAILURE 
UNINTELLIGENT 
LITTERED 
DRIPPED 
MOUNTED 
FROZEN 
REASONED 
CLATTERING 
LOUNGING 
MERRY 
STRENUOUS 
TRADED 
WORKMEN 
INTERMEDIATE 
Positive/Gratification Non-Positive/Gratification 
HANDSOME 
COOPERATIVE 
REALISTIC 
AROUSED 
ADVENTUROUS 
INTELLIGENT 
ALERT 
COOLNESS 
CONSIDERATE 
WINNER 
EXCITEMENT 
VERSATILE 
FLOWING 
EMBROIDERED 
EXCLUSIVE 
RETIRED 
PHOTOGRAPHED 
SCRAMBLED 
TENTH 
PILGRIMS 
PAINSTAKING 
PADDLE 
ACTIVITIES 
SQUATTING 
Sutker, DeSanto, and Allain (1985) in a study of self-description among 
antisocial personalities. Six additional words highly relevant to 
positive self-description and personal gratification (i.e., winner, 
aroused, handsome, versatile, excitement, coolness), appearing in APD 
descriptions by Cleckley (1976) and Brantley and Sutker (1984) completed 
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this stimulus list. These words were frequency-matched within 2 SFI 
units to the threat stimuli described above using tables presented by 
Carroll, Davies, and Richman, (1971). 
Control stimuli. Two further sets consisting of 12 non-threat and 
12 non-positive/qratification control words were chosen that were 
frequency-matched (within 0.1 SFI unit for all but two words; F + 20%) 
and length-matched to the words within each set of experimental stimuli. 
These control words were selected by the first author from a larger pool 
of potential matched words on the basis of low rankings on 5-point 
rating scales of implied threat and implied positive quality made by 
three independent judges. 
Simple color stimuli. Each item in this set consisted of a series 
of six 0s, printed in one of the four colors described above. These 
stimuli were intended to assess subjects' response speed in color-naming 
stimuli devoid of semantic content. 
Conflicting color stimuli. These were the four color names blue, 
green, red, and orange. This set essentially duplicated the original 
Stroop task and provided maximal conflict between semantic content and 
required response. 
For the word recognition task, the 48 different words of the above 
stimulus sets (excluding the simple color and conflicting color stimuli) 
were printed on a two-page response form (see Appendix B), randomly 
interspersed with 48 distractor words chosen to be matched to the 
original words on frequency, length, and threat or 
positive/gratification content. Thus, there were 12 threat distractors, 
12 positive/gratification distractors, 12 non-threat distractors, and 12 
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non-positive/gratification distractors, all appearing in random order 
with the original words. As with the original control words, most 
distractors were selected from a larger word pool on the basis of 
ratings made by three independent judges. Six of the 
positive/gratification distractors were new words selected from APD 
self-descriptors identified by Sutker, Desanto, and Allain (1985), as 
previously described. Each word on the response form was followed by 
the printed words old and new and a 3-point confidence rating scale (1 = 
little confidence, 2 = some confidence, and 3 = much confidence), on 
which subjects entered their responses for the task. Printed subject 
instructions were included on the form. 
Procedure 
Routine assessment occurred subsequent to drug detoxification, and 
was completed approximately 14 days after program entry. A staff 
psychologist permanently assigned to DDTU and/or a clinical psychology 
intern with advanced graduate training administered individually the 
self-report measures of symptomatology and cognitive sophistication, and 
conducted one or more individual interviews with each inpatient to 
complete the BIQ. Patients then filled out the SCID-II screening 
questionaire and were interviewed by the psychologist following the 
latter's review of this questionaire, the BIQ, and all charted medical 
and psychiatric data including results of a diagnostic interview by a 
psychiatrist on DDTU. These procedures were designed to bring to 
attention any Axis I or other concommitant pathology affecting 
diagnosis, and to enable the psychologist to probe and clarify lapses or 
inconsistencies in self-report data during administration of the 
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SCID-II, as per published instructions for that instrument. To derive PD 
diagnoses, the interviewer completed the Summary Score Sheet of the 
SCID-II using Spitzer and William's (1986) 3-point scoring scale. 
Diagnostic decision rules followed the guidelines specified by 
DSM-III-R, e.g., at least 4 criteria exceeded threshold for a PPD 
diagnosis. 
Psychological assessment results for each inpatient were reviewed 
by the principal investigator to identify potential subjects for 
inclusion in each of three study groups: (1) Paranoid PD; (2) Antisocial 
PD; and (3) NonPD. To qualify for a PD group, patients met or exceeded 
DSM-III-R criteria for Paranoid PD or Antisocial PD but not both, as 
assessed by SCID-II. NonPD subjects received subthreshold ratings for 
all DSM-III-R PD diagnostic categories. Men scoring below 80 on the 
Shipley or reporting color-blindness during the BIQ interview were 
excluded from study participation. Any veteran giving evidence during 
psychological assessment interviews or the psychiatric evaluation of 
past or present psychotic symptomatology, or currently meeting DSM-III-R 
criteria for an Organic Mental Disorder, Major Depression, or Bipolar 
Disorder was also ineligible for inclusion. 
During the period of the study, 38 qualifying volunteers were 
identified and completed experimental procedures: of this number, 10 
subjects fell in each of the PD groups, and 18 subjects met NonPD 
criteria. Prior to participation, these men were provided with a 
description of the nature of the investigation and signed consent forms 
(see Appendix C). As may be seen in Table 2, groups did not differ 
significantly in age, Shipley IQ estimate, or years of formal 
Table 2 
Mean Subject Demographic Characteristics and Mean Scores on 
Psvchopathology Measures With Standard Errors by Group 
Non Antisocial Paranoid 
PD PD PD 
Variable M SE H SB N SE £(2,35) 
Age 32.67 1.17 32.60 1.27 33.50 1.26 0.14 
Education 12.78 0.31 11.70 0.45 11.70 0.40 3.14 
Shipley IQ 
t 
111.70 2.77 106.70 2.92 105.90 2.79 1.28 
STAI A-State 41.88 1.80 47.00 4.23 54.20 3.89 4.23* 
Beck 11.94 1.81 15.70 2.87 26.20 3.11 8.S3*** 
MMPI scales 
Psychopathic 
Deviate 70,78 2.14 83.80 3.08 79.80 2.71 7.38" 
Paranoia 58.06 1.60 65.30 3.16 73.70 3.35 10.38*** 
Social 
Introversion 52.72 1.90 50.90 2.98 61.10 2.99 4.02* 
Note. STAI = State - Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
Beck = Beck Depression Inventory. 
MMPI » Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. 
*£<•05 
*•£<.01 
*«*£<.001 
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education. Racial composition was approximately equally distributed 
across the three groups, each containing either 1 or 2 non-Black 
subjects. As expected, elevations on the MMPI's Psychopathic Deviate 
and Paranoia scales differed significantly across the groups, with 
Antisocials showing the greatest mean on the former scale and Paranoids 
the highest mean on the latter. Subsequent Fisher's least significant 
difference (LSD) tests indicated that both PD groups differed 
significantly from NonPDs on each of these two MMPI scales, with the 
Paranoid group scoring significantly higher than Antisocials on the 
Paranoid scale. Using the commonly accepted conservative cutoff T-score 
of 70 (K-corrected) as a lower threshold marker for clinically 
significant elevations, all groups evidenced significant pathology on 
the Psychopathic Deviate scale, reflecting the high base rate of 
antisocial behavior reported by inpatients on DDTU. Only the Paranoid 
group mean exceeded this clinical criterion on the Paranoia scale, 
however. Consistent with unvalidated DSM-III-R descriptions, Paranoids 
also showed significantly greater mean elevations on the MMPI's Social 
Introversion scale relative to the other groups, which were not 
differentiated by this measure. In accord with expectations that group 
assignment would reflect differences in self-reported distress levels 
between PD and NonPD subjects, groups differed significantly on mean 
A-State STAI and Beck scores. Both PD groups showed greater mean scores 
on these measures relative to NonPDs, with LSD tests indicating that the 
difference achieved statistical significance between Paranoid and NonPD 
groups on the STAI, and between Paranoid and both remaining groups on 
the Beck. 
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Subjects completed all portions of the color naming and word 
recognition tasks in single individual sessions occurring three to four 
weeks following admission to DDTU. Average duration of testing sessions 
was 25 min, with the experimenter present throughout. For the majority 
of subjects, tasks were administered by a female psychology graduate 
student completing a practicum on DDTU. Two subjects in each group had 
tasks administered by a female secretary with 12 years of experience pn 
DDTU, who was used when the student was unavailable. Both experimenters 
received prior training in administering the tasks and were blind to 
experimental hypotheses. Reliability spot checks of experimenters' 
timing of color-naming task responses were conducted randomly by the 
first author for approximately one-sixth of all subjects. In all cases, 
reliability data agreed with experimenter's times within 1 s for each of 
« 
the six task cards. 
Each color naming task consisted of the presentation of one of the 
six stimulus cards described above, during which subjects named 
individual word colors (i.e., specific ink colors) of the 96 items on 
the card face as rapidly as possible while being timed with a digital 
stopwatch by the experimenter. The dependent variable for each task was 
the total time taken to name all colors on the card. Before the first 
task was presented subjects were familiarized with the colors used. 
They were then shown the simple color stimulus card and instructed to 
name the colors in order as quickly as possible without making errors 
(see Appendix D for subject instructions). Timing started when the first 
color on the card was named and ended when the last color was named. 
The experimenter recorded times to the nearest 0.1 s on a standard 
68 
recording form (see Appendix E). The conflicting-color card was the 
second task presented to all subjects, who were further instructed to 
ignore word content while color naming. Order of the remaining four 
color-naming tasks varied as follows: the appropriate control card task 
always immediately preceded an experimental card task, but the order of 
these pairs (i.e., non-threat and threat tasks, and 
non-pleasure/gratification and pleasure-gratification tasks) was 
counterbalanced across subjects. In addition to equalizing gross order 
effects across groups, this design ensured that any within-session 
practice effects tended to counteract the experimental hypotheses rather 
than provide an alternative explanation for specific slowing effects 
(c.f. Watts, et al., 1986). Task administration proceded without 
interruption as rapidly as possible, with approximately 10-s intervals 
between cards. As in similar prior studies, errors in color naming were 
infrequent and tended to be corrected by subjects spontaneously, and 
were not recorded. 
The word recognition test immediately followed the sixth 
color-naming task. This test was not timed. Subjects were presented 
with a pencil and the 96-word response form described above and were 
instructed to indicate whether each word was old, i.e., had appeared on 
a card in the first task, or was new, by circling their choice. 
Subjects also rated their confidence in each of these decisions by 
marking on the 3-point scales printed next to each word. Subjects were 
not informed prior to the onset of this task that they would be asked to 
recognize words from the cards. Upon completion of the response form 
subjects were debriefed (see Appendix F) and provided with feedback 
about their performance. 
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RESULTS 
Color Naming Tasks 
Mean times to complete color naming for each card by group are 
presented in Figure 1. All groups showed minimum completion times on 
the simple color (SC) card and maximum times on the conflicting color 
(CC) card. Consistent with experimental predictions, the Paranoid 
subjects evidenced longer completion times on the threat (T) card than 
on non-threat (NT), positive/gratification (PG), or 
non-positive/gratification (NPG) cards, an effect that was not apparent 
across Antisocial and NonPD groups. In order to evaluate effects of 
group and card type, separate 3 (group) X 2 (card) analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) with repeated measures across cards were carried out on 
completion times for SC/CC, NPG/PG, and NT/T card type pairs. The first 
of these ANOVAs addresses the possibility of generalized color naming 
and Stroop test performance differences between groups, and the two 
latter analyses compare performance on each experimental card with that 
on matched control cards. Because the observed values of the dependent 
measure for this task exhibited a tendency to show increased variability 
as their magnitude increased, all analyses to be reported were performed 
on both raw elapsed-time scores and data derived from a natural log 
transformation of these scores. The latter theoretically permit more 
valid statistical testing by reducing the effects of the non-normal 
outcome distribution. However, in all cases raw and transformed data 
yielded identical results within a given level of statistical 
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significance. To facilitate interpretation, only results derived from 
analysis of nontransformed data are presented. 
Results for the ANOVA across SC/CC cards confirmed the significant 
main effect of these card types across groups, F(l, 35) =110.96, £<.001 
(see Table 3). As shown in Figure 1, all groups demonstrated the basic 
Table 3 
Two-Way ANOVA: Simple Color and Conflicting Color Cards by Group 
Source df MS 
Within 35 
Grand Mean 
Group 2 608.54 0.82 .45 
Ss(Group) 35 739.86 
Card 1 42265.70 110.96 «.01 
Group X Card 2 379.87 1.00 .38 
Ss(Group) X Card 35 380.92 
Stroop effect by producing longer completion times on the CC card. 
Group and Group X Card interaction effects were not significant in this 
analysis; thus, there was no indication of a systematic between-group 
difference in speed of simple color naming or performance on the 
relatively difficult Stroop task involving conflicting color names. 
Similarly, results for the ANOVA across NPG/PG cards showed no 
significant main or interaction effects involving groups or card 
types (see Table 4), indicating that groups did not respond 
differentially to positive/gratification versus matched control cards on 
the timed measure. 
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Table 4 
Two-Way ANOVA: Non-Positive/Gratification 
and Positive/Gratification Cards by Group 
Source df MS F £ 
Within 35 
Grand Mean 1 
Group 2 863.22 2.21 .13 
Ss(Group) 35 391.40 
Card 1 113.34 2,. 27 .14 
Group X Card 2 47.12 0.94 .40 
Ss(Group) X Card 35 49.92 
In contrast to the above results, analysis of scores on T and NT 
cards yielded highly significant effects of card type, F(l, 35) = 22.92, 
£<.001, and a significant Group X Card interaction, F(2, 35) = 4.78, 
£=.01 (see Table 5). There was not a significant main effect of group. 
Planned contrasts indicated that men characterized as Paranoid PDs 
differed significantly from NonPDs (t = 2.79, £<.01) and Antisocials (t 
= 2.68, £ = .01) on difference scores between NT and T cards, whereas 
the Antisocial group did not differ significantly from NonPD subjects on 
this measure (commonly referred to as the interference index). Figure 1 
illustrates these effects which confirm experimental predictions of 
significantly increased response times in Paranoids on threat-related 
material. Relative to the other two groups, Paranoid PD subjects were 
significantly slowed on color-naming T words compared to NT control 
words. 
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Table 5 
Two-Way ANOVA: Non-Threat and Threat Cards by Group 
Source df MS F £ 
Within 35 
Grand Mean 1 
Group 2 794.45 1.62 .21 
Ss(Group) 35 489.56 
Card 1 689.06 22.92 «.01 
Group X Card 2 143.83 4.78 .01 
Ss(Group) X Card 35 30.06 
Planned contrasts: t £ 
Paranoid PD vs. Non-PD 2.79 <.01 
Paranoid PD vs. Antisocial PD 2.68 .01 
In order to evaluate further the nature of group performance 
differences, additional analysis was conducted incorporating data for 
all four experimental cards: NPG, PG, T, and NT. A one-way multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) across the three groups with repeated 
measures over the four cards indicated no significant main effect of 
group (Pillais trace = .24, F = .17, df = 6, 68, £>.10). Thus, when 
performance of the three groups was analyzed over several cards 
containing predominantly nonthreat stimuli closely matched on length and 
frequency, between-group differences were nonsignificant, supporting the 
specificity of the significant interaction between group and threat 
stimuli shown in Table 5. 
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Table 6 
Polynomial Contrasts Based On One-Way MANOVA: 
Non-Threat, Threat, Non-Pleasure/Gratification, 
and Pleasure/Gratification Cards by Group 
t E 
Linear 
Paranoid PD vs. Non-PD 1.05 .30 
Paranoid PD vs. Antisocial PD 0.50 .62 
Quadratic 
Paranoid PD vs. Non-PD 0.69 .49 
Paranoid PD vs. Antisocial PD 0.92 .36 
Cubic 
Paranoid PD vs. Non-PD 2.10 .04 
Paranoid PD vs. Antisocial PD 2.01 .05 
To provide additional confirmation of the specific effect of threat 
stimuli on Paranoid response times, polynomial contrasts were conducted 
in the above analysis comparing the functions described by each group's 
performance across the four experimental cards. The pairwise contrasts 
tested for linear, quadratic, and cubic component differences between 
these three functions. Because a substantial cubic component, i.e., 
indicating two angular deflections, occurs when a function includes a 
single point departing significantly from an otherwise linear trend, 
contrasts on this component comprised a test of between-group effects 
involving differences on only one of the four 
experimental cards. Results confirmed a significant Group X Card 
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interaction for the cubic component, with Paranoids differing 
significantly on this component compared both to NonPDs, t = 2.10, 
£<.05, and Antisocials, t =2.01, £ = .05 (see Table 6). The contrasts 
for linear and quadratic components did not approach statistical 
significance. Results substantiate the between-groups performance 
difference on the T card apparent in Figure 1, by demonstrating that 
increased response times among Paranoids on this one card were of 
sufficient magnitude to produce a significant cubic trend in Paranoid 
group performance across the four experimental cards relative to 
performance of the Antisocial and NonPD groups. 
To evaluate the possibility of an overall or interactive effect of 
order of presentation of experimental card pairs during the color naming 
tasks, a 2 (order) X 3 (group) X 4 (card) ANOVA was performed across 
NPG, PG, NT, and T cards. Results indicated that neither a main effect 
of order nor an interactive effect involving Group and Order factors 
approached statistical significance. Thus, there was no evidence of 
significant practice, fatigue, or distraction effects in any group's 
performance. 
Because groups differed significantly on A-State STAI and Beck 
measures, additional analyses were conducted to test the possibility 
that elevations on one or both of these indices of self-reported 
affective distress correlated significantly with color-naming task 
performance independent of PD diagnosis. Overall Pearson product-moment 
correlations relating STAI scores and response times for each of the six 
task cards were uniformly nonsignificant, disconfirming the hypothesis 
that differential STAI score elevations alone could account for 
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differences in performance on T across groups (see Table 7). Because 
correlations between Beck scores and response times were statistically 
significant for the four experimental cards, a 3 (groups) X 2 (cards NT 
and T) analysis of covariance with repeated measures on the Card factor, 
using Beck scores as covariates, was performed on color-naming response 
Table 7 
Correlations Between Color-Naming Response Times and Affective 
Distress Measures by Card Type 
Card STAI Beck 
r £ r £ 
Simple Color -0. 05 .38 0. 14 .21 
Conflicting Color -0, .24 .07 -0. 07 .33 
Non-Threat 0. 02 .46 0. 32 .02 
Threat 0. 15 .19 0. 41 .01 
Non-Positive/Gratification 0. ,04 .41 0. 32 .03 
Positive/Gratification 0. 22 .10 0, .46 .00 
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory A-State Scale. 
Beck = Beck Depression Inventory. 
times to adjust for effects of subject differences on the Beck. This 
analysis yielded a nonsignificant regression term for the covariate, 
F(l,34) = 3.50, £>.05. Thus, the hypothesis that significant Beck score 
differences accounted for the observed performance differences across 
groups on T and NT cards was also disconfirmed. 
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Word Recognition Task 
Computation of SDT analysis indices of discriminability and 
response bias requires a defined signal- and noise-stimulus-event pair. 
For this study of word recognition, the signal event was the 
presentation of an old word (i.e., a word included in the prior color 
naming tasks) and the noise event was the presentation of a new word. 
To calculate the SDT indices in this experiment, subjects' confidence 
ratings (1, 2, or 3) for each response (old or new) on the word 
recognition task were recoded to range from 1 (indicating much 
confidence that a word was new) to 6 (indicating much confidence that a 
word was old). Thus, a series of six increasingly stringent criterion 
levels for reporting the occurrence of the signal event was generated 
for each subject. 
In order to avoid assumptions concerning the shape of the 
underlying noise and signal-plus-noise distributions, commonly-used 
nonparametric indices of discriminability, P(A) (McNicol, 1972), and 
response bias, B_|_ (Grier, 1971; Hodos, 1970) were computed. Compared to 
the original SDT indices d^_ and Lx, these nonparametric counterparts are 
noted to offer greater stability when the number of observations is 
relatively low, as in the present study (McNicol, 1972). The 
discriminability index P(A) represents the area under a receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve derived by plotting hit rate 
against false-alarm rate at each confidence criteria location. It has 
an upper limit of 1.00, this value indicating perfect ability to 
distinguish signal and noise events. A P(A) value of .50 corresponds to 
no discrimination, i.e. chance performance. B_[_ can range in value from 
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-1.00 to 1.00, with higher scores representing a more conservative 
report criterion. Thus, in the present study, higher values of P(A) 
indicated enhanced ability to identify previously-presented words 
accurately, and lower scores represented an enhanced tendency or bias 
to report that a word was old. 
To evaluate the possibility that groups differed on overall ability 
to discriminate old words during the recognition task, a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted on individual P(A) scores calculated by a computer program 
that plotted ROC curves for each subject, incorporating data for all 
four word types. This and all subsequent analyses included 35 subjects 
only; data from 3 subjects (1 from each group) were unusable because of 
obvious response sets, e.g., all words marked new, or failure to 
complete the response form in its entirety. As shown in Table 8, all 
three groups showed mean P(A) values that indicated greater than chance 
performance. Statistical results demonstrated that groups did not 
differ significantly on these overall P(A) scores, F(2,32) = 2.23, 
£>.10. Overall response bias differences were also tested by 
calculating B_|_ for the criterion levels 2 through 6 for each subject, 
using Grier's (1971) computational formula (B_|_ can only be computed for 
N - 1 of N criterion levels because cumulative frequencies of signal and 
noise equal 1.00 at the final level). These Bj_ scores were entered into 
one-way ANOVAs across groups. Again results indicated that groups did 
not differ significantly on SDT indices describing recognition 
performance across all word types (see Table 8). 
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Table 8 
Mean Scores on Discriminability arid Response Bias Indices by Group 
NonPD Antisocial PD Paranoid PD 
Criterion P(A) B^ P(A) IV P(A) B^_ F(2,32) 
.6047 .6072 .5552 2.23 ns 
6 .1830 .2417 .0618 1.27 ns 
5 .0792 .1127 -.0277 1.22 ns 
4 .0171 .0844 -.0499 1.19 ns 
3 -.1549 -.0490 -.0411 1.15 ns 
2 -.0004 -.1446 -.2130 0.63 ns 
Note. £>.10 for all F-ratios 
To test for possible between-group differences on recognition 
performance with specific word types, values of P(A) and B_|_ were 
calculated for each set of old and new T, NT, PG, and NPG words 
separately. Because of the small number of observations per subject for 
each word type, separate SDT indices were calculated for the three 
groups as though each was a single observer receiving (N X 12) signal 
and (N X 12) noise trials, where N equalled the number of subjects per 
group. A rationale for such subject pooling in SDT experiments with 
limited numbers of observations has been explicated by Chapman and 
Feather (1971) and Lee (1969). Recently, Swets (1986) has provided 
numerous illustrations of the derivation of discriminability and 
response criterion measures from appropriately pooled data. In the 
present study, computational formulas published by Bamber (1975) 
expressly for this purpose were used to calculate values of P(A) (also 
81 
known as the Ag index) across group and word types. These values are 
presented in Table 9. Bamber's (1975) formulas also provided variance 
estimates for each P(A) value, which were used to conduct pairwise t 
tests to compare recognition discriminability for each of the four word 
types (i.e., for old versus new words of each type) among groups. These 
Table 9 
Mean Scores on Discriminability Indices by Word Type and Group 
Group Pairwise Comparison 
NPD APD PPD NPD APD NPD 
Word APD PPD PPD 
type P(A) P(A) P(A) t(622) t(430) t(622) 
NPG 
PG 
NT 
T 
.4821 
.6498 
.6084 
.6746 
.5600 
.6466 
.5562 
.6403 
.5318 
.5934 
.6156 
.5260 
28.90** 7.56** 18.37** 
1.27 15.10** 22.04** 
19.70** 16.41** 2.78* 
13.59** 31.95** 57.31** 
Note. NPD = Non-personality-disorder. APD = Antisocial Personality 
Disorder. PPD = Paranoid Personality Disorder. 
NPG = non-positive/gratification. PG = positive/gratification. NT = 
non-threat. T = threat. 
*£<.01 
**£<.001 
tests indicated highly significant between-groups differences on all but 
one comparison. Paranoids differed from nonPDs and Antisocials on all 
comparisons, showing significantly decreased sensitivity relative to 
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both remaining groups on PG and T word types. The most dichotomous 
between-group P(A) scores occurred with threat stimuli. As shown in 
Table 9, within-groups trends across card types differed between groups. 
Specifically, Paranoid PD subjects evidenced their lowest mean P(A) 
score on T material, whereas, both other groups showed their greatest or 
near-greatest P(A) scores on recognition of threat words. 
Pairwise t tests were also conducted to compare group response bias 
indices (B_^) across word types, computed for ratings of 2 through 6 
using the computational formulas of Grier (1971) as previously described 
(see Appendix G for B^_ and t values). Results did not approach 
statistical significance for any comparison. Thus, there was no 
indication of any systematic within or between-group response bias 
interaction involving the differing types of word stimuli used in this 
investigation. 
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DISCUSSION 
The goals of this investigation were to validate the thesis that 
persons meeting criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder evidence a 
significant hypersensitivity to threat that affects their responses to 
threat-related features of the environment in predictable ways, and to 
initiate study of these response patterns by operationalizing this 
hypersensitivity in terms of performance differences on color-naming and 
recognition tasks involving threat words. As predicted, PPD subjects 
showed significant differences in performance on both of these tasks 
when threat stimuli were involved, relative to 
non-personality-disordered persons and those meeting diagnostic criteria 
for Antisocial PD. The comparison groups did not differ significantly 
in performance on either of the two hypervigilance tasks with the 
exception of certain recognition discriminability scores, and, unlike 
PPD results, the latter differences did not constitute a between-groups 
divergence in overall discriminability score patterns for threat versus 
non-threat stimuli. Thus, this study was successful in demonstrating 
specific response style patterns differentiating the PPD individual from 
matched PD and non-PD controls drawn from the same population. 
The main finding of this investigation was that, as hypothesized, 
c 
only the PPD group was significantly slower in color-naming 
threat-related words relative to matched non-threat words. The high 
degree of specificity of this effect (i.e., a unique interaction between 
PPDs and threat stimuli) can be appreciated when performance of all 
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three groups is considered across all six Stroop tasks. There is no 
suggestion of a generalized performance deficit among PPDs on this type 
of procedure; in fact, performance levels across groups are remarkably 
similar on all color-naming tasks not involving threat words. Moreover, 
both non-PPD groups showed mean response time patterns that did not 
differ between experimental word sets and matched controls, just as 
PPDs1 latencies did not differ between positive/gratification stimuli 
and matched controls. Multiple statistical analyses support the 
impression derived from visual inspection of results that a specific 
between-groups performance difference in the direction predicted 
occurred on and was limited to the color-naming task involving threat 
stimuli. In sum, the response-delay effect seen in the PPD group when 
color-naming threat words to support the conceptualization of 
hypersensitivity to threat in PPDs under these conditions. This 
represents the first time that hypersensitivity differences have been 
quantified under controlled conditions in a Paranoid Personality sample. 
The nature of the increased latency effect observed among PPDs in 
the threat word Stroop task results is subject to various 
conceptualizations. For example, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) have 
suggested a theoretical framework for Stroop interference among anxious 
subjects which proposes that differences in the type, extent, or ease of 
activation of preexisting cognitive schemata present across subject 
groups can interact with congruent cues provided by specific Stroop 
stimuli to produce enhanced processing of schema-congruent information 
(e.g., threat content) that competes with alternative processing demands 
(e.g., color naming) in a limited-capacity system. This might suggest 
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that PPDs tend to maintain such threat-related schemata in relatively 
permanent states of activation. The Mathews and MacLeod (1985) account 
thus assumes that biased processing of threat signals gives rise to 
interference directly. 
An alternative conceptualization has been provided by Harvey 
(1984), who argued that Stroop interference arises over trials because 
subjects experience difficulty in maintaining an attentional set aimed 
at reducing the amount of processing accorded to irrelevant stimulus 
aspects (e.g., semantic content) while responding on a color-naming 
task. Application of this explanation to results of the present study 
would imply that PPDs, unlike remaining subjects, experienced greater 
distraction effects from threat words and were less able to maintain 
their attending to relevant non-threatening aspects of the stimulus 
array. Both Harvey's (1984) and Mathews and MacLeod's (1985) 
conceptualizations are consistent with the formulation of threat-related 
discriminative and attentional differences in hypersensitive PPDs. The 
former account has the benefit of empirical support in that several 
predictions derived from the general model have been experimentally 
confirmed in laboratory studies (Harvey, 1984). Of note as a corollary 
of Harvey's account is the suggestion that emotional arousal can disrupt 
the maintaining of the attentional set required to minimize Stroop 
effects (cf. Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Thus, the mechanism of 
distraction by threat stimuli in PPDs might be mediated by or at least 
correlated with alterations in arousal during the threat-word Stroop 
task, a potentially testable hypothesis, and PPD results on the 
color-naming tasks might be construed as a special example in support of 
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what has been called the perceptual defense and vigilance hypothesis 
(e.g., Erdelyi, 1974), which maintains that perception of stimuli may be 
inhibited (perceptual defense) or enhanced (perceptual vigilance) as a 
function of the input's emotionality. 
Although the above accounts of Stroop interference have emphasized 
differences at the level of cognitive processing of threat-related 
information, other researchers have argued that any theory assuming only 
a single locus for interference effects is incompatible with the 
extended body of empirical findings pertaining to Stroop performance and 
is thus necessarily incomplete (cf. Stirling, 1979). For example, some 
investigators have stressed the importance of distinguishing the effect 
of a primed distractor on the encoding of information from its role in 
eliciting one or more responses (e.g., Seymour, 1977), and response 
competition may constitute a viable account of Stroop interference. 
This is the form an operant analysis might take; for instance, differing 
aspects (i.e., color, letter configuration) of the threat words of the 
Stroop task could be seen to function as discriminative stimuli for two 
or more incompatible responses on the part of the PPD subject, with each 
response maintained by robust histories of positive or negative 
reinforcement under similar conditions. In this scheme, the origin of 
these discriminative stimuli and the differential learning histories of 
the subjects remain to be explicated before the nature of the unique 
hypersensitive responses in PPDs is fully analyzed. 
Contrary to experimental predictions, Antisocial PD subjects 
evidenced a nonsignificant trend towards reduced times on PG relative to 
NPG stimuli during the Stroop tasks. Thus, there was no indication 
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whatsoever among APDs of differential hypersensitivity to positive 
words, nor toward any of the stimuli tested. Although moderately 
increased sensitivity to positive or gratification-related words was 
predicted in these subjects on the basis of their documented tendency to 
respond under many conditions in a manner that maximizes short-term 
pleasure,-the absence of a hypersensitivity effect can be viewed as 
consistent with accumulated findings of relatively poor control by 
verbal stimuli (Brantley & Sutker, 1984) and, possibly, relatively low 
tolerance of monotony (cf., Quay, 1965, Widom, 1976) among persons 
meeting APD criteria. It might be speculated that tasks incorporating 
primary and/or more immediate or salient reinforcement would be 
necessary to elicit differential hypersensitivity in Antisocial 
Personality subjects. For example, relative to non-antisocial 
individuals, APD learning-task performance has been shown to be 
differentially more improved by monetary rewards than verbal 
consequences (Schmauk, 1970). Thus, it seems plausible that more 
powerful or functional reinforcers such as money would be required to 
affect APD attention and discrimination in a selective manner. In this 
study, APD performance across word types did not differ significantly 
from that of non-PDs, and the APD group thus serves to provide 
additional validation of differential hypersensitivity to threat in PPDs 
by bolstering the breadth of the comparison sample and controlling for 
non-paranoid distinctions between PD and non-PD subjects. 
On the word recognition task, PPDs did show significant differences 
in discriminability across word types relative to the non-PPD groups, as 
was predicted. However, the direction of these differences was opposite 
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to that hypothesized. PPDs evidenced their worst mean recognition 
performance on threat words relative to other stimuli, whereas APD and 
non-PD groups tended to show maximum discriminability indices with 
threat-related material. Moreover, mean PPD discriminability indices 
for threat words were significantly decreased compared to those of the 
remaining groups. Although these significant differences serve to 
establish additional systematic distinctions characterizing PPDs, the 
results appear to contradict a formulation of increased attending to 
threat stimuli in this hypervigilant population. It might be argued 
that the hypothesized pattern of differences in attending did occur 
during the Stroop tasks but was of insufficient duration or otherwise 
incapable of improving sensitivity during the relatively difficult 
recognition task, and similar conclusions have sometimes been derived 
from findings of dichotic listening and other studies (cf. Kintsch, 
1977). However, this does not address the present findings of 
significantly reduced recognition sensitivity for threat words among 
PPDs, across remaining groups and stimulus types. 
Three accounts of the observed recognition sensitivity outcomes 
will be considered. First, it is possible that selective 
hypersensitivity as shown in this study involves not increased attention 
directed toward members of a stimulus class, but rather an enhanced 
perceptual acuity that can be described by what has been called 
increased automatic processing of stimuli belonging to that class (e.g., 
Posner, 1978, 1982; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Kahneman and Treisman 
(1984) have defined automatic mental operations of this sort as follows: 
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An automatic process is involuntary; that is, it can be triggered 
without a supporting intention and, once started, cannot be stopped 
intentionally. An automatic process does not draw on general 
resources, is not subject to interference from attended activities, 
and does not interfere with such activities . . .Three levels of 
automaticity can be distinguished in perception: (1) An act of 
perceptual processing is strongly automatic if it is neither 
facilitated by focusing attention on a stimulus, nor impaired by 
diverting attention from it . . . (2) It is partially automatic if 
it is normally completed even when attention is diverted from the 
stimulus, but can be speeded or facilitated by attention . . . (3) 
A perceptual process is occasionally automatic if it generally 
requires attention but can sometimes be completed without it. (p. 
42) 
If it is assumed that PPDs show a differential tendency to process 
threat-related material with greater automaticity, relative to other 
groups and different material, and particularly if they show more 
strongly automatic processing of threat, as defined above, this could 
account for their increased latencies on the threat-word Stroop task, 
and also could be expected to produce diminished recognition for 
threat-related material as a function of decreased encoding (Kahneman & 
Treisman, 1984). As Kahneman and Treisman (1984) point out (p.43), 
reading familiar words is often cited as a prototypal automatic process, 
and the Stroop task is frequently invoked to demonstrate the 
automaticity of reading, because subjects apparently read uncontrollably 
even though it is in their best interest not to do so. However, these 
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and other researchers (e.g., Francolini & Egeth, 1980), based upon 
review of a body of experiments involving various distractor stimuli, 
argue that the reading of words during Stroop tasks normally is not 
strongly automatic in the above sense, and that the automatic process of 
reading in the task depends on the manner in which stimuli are attended. 
Possibly, PPDs selectively process threat-related material in a more 
strongly automatic manner than normal subjects. It is generally 
accepted by cognitive theorists that the ability to encode and retrieve 
material in memory is inversely proportional to the degree of 
automaticity in initial processing (Neely, 1977; Underwood, 1976; 
Warren, 1974). Thus, one conceptualization of PPD hypersensitivity to 
threat that could account for differential Stroop and recognition 
performance on threat-related tasks in the present study maintains that 
« 
the paranoid subjects evidenced a perceptual difference involving 
greater automaticity of processing for threat stimuli. 
A second possibility to account for the reduced recognition 
sensitivity for threat in hypersensitive PPDs is that the presentation 
of stimuli highly primed for attention and discrimination further primed 
closely associated or related stimuli (e.g., distractor threat stimuli) 
in these subjects, and that this disrupted accurate recognition relative 
to that for less highly primed stimuli. Similar disruptive effects of 
experimentally primed stimuli on recognition were noted previously in 
the Bruce (1979) study involving search for political figures. This 
explanation essentially posits that threat-related stimuli are so 
salient for PPDs that they overwhelm or otherwise impair accurate 
discrimination and/or memory of the context in which they appear, 
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possibly by distracting attention from contextual cues. Thus, this 
general account could accord with the notion of differentiating patterns 
of attending to the environment related to differential discrimination 
of threat among PPDs, but it departs from the original prediction of 
enhanced recognition of previously-seen threat stimuli in emphasizing 
the narrow focus of this attention. The implications of this 
conceptualization of observed performance differences, i.e., that in 
discriminating and attending to threat stimuli the PPD individual shows 
relative insensitivity to context, frequency, or history of exposure to 
the threat, are consistent with many clinical descriptions of the 
behaviors shown by these people (e.g., Cameron, 1963). 
The final account of PPD threat recognition differences that will 
be proposed is related to that last described, and follows the original 
formulation of PPD hypersensitivity including the prediction that such 
subjects will show enhanced attending to threat stimuli. However, this 
third explanation of findings postulates that the aspect of the stimulus 
that is hypersensitively attended - and possibly subject to increased 
recognition discriminability - is not the word itself but rather threat 
content per se. Thus, the PPD may perform relatively poorly on a 
recognition task in which old threat words are presented with 
equally-threatening distractors, but could show superior performance on 
a task involving previously-seen threat words and matched non-threat 
distractors. This account is similar to the previous one and is 
consistent with the formulation of heightened attending to threat 
stimuli in PPDs, but emphasizes an enhancement of recognition 
sensitivity for the occurrence of threat that is not necessarily 
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specific enough to discriminate particular words. This hypothesis is 
potentially testable within an experimental design using Signal 
Detection Theory analysis. 
Although subject to diverse interpretations, the differences in 
recognition of threat versus non-threat words noted across groups appear 
especially significant given the pattern of differential Stroop results 
in this study. Moreover, the failure to observe similar group by 
stimulus-type interactions on recognition sensitivity measures in other 
studies involving significant Stroop effects raises the intriguing 
possibility that the effects seen in the present study reflect a highly 
distinctive process or perceptual effect that is specific to PPD 
hypervigilance, rather than a necessary concommitant of differences in 
Stroop performance. For example, the Mathews and MacLeod (1985) 
experiment involving anxious subjects and threat stimuli, described 
earlier, also assessed recognition sensitivity for threat and non-threat 
words following completion of Stroop tasks in a manner quite similar to 
that of this study. Despite highly specific differences in Stroop 
interference across groups in the predicted direction, there were no 
group differences in ability to discriminate the different types of 
stimuli from matched,distractors. 
In the present study, overall recognition sensitivity indices 
(i.e., for all old versus new words) failed to show significant 
differences across groups. Although PPDs' P(A) scores did show a 
nonsignificant decreased trend relative to the other groups' sensitivity 
indices, consistent with the direction of experimental predictions, this 
decrease would appear to be explained at least in part by the lessened 
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abilities among PPDs to discriminate old from new threat stimuli. There 
was little support in the data for an effect of reduced discriminability 
of previously-seen non-threat words in paranoid subjects. Thus, threat 
stimuli did not appear to induce cognitive masking as defined by Erdelyi 
and Blumenthal (1973). 
There was also no evidence among general or pooled BJ_ indices for 
consistent between-groups differences in the tendency or bias to report 
that specific threat stimuli had already been seen during the first task 
of the study. Although negative results are problematic for deriving 
firm conclusions, the absence of significant response bias effects in 
the context of significant discriminability differences is of interest 
because it strengthens the suggestion that recognition performance 
distinctions occurred independent of motivational differences or demand 
characteristics (cf., Chapman & Feather, 1971). Erdelyi (1974) is among 
researchers who have argued that the failure to find response bias 
distinctions in such tasks supports the conceptualization that 
individual differences in perceptual organization underly observed 
discriminability differences. Compared to other SDT tasks that have 
been described in the literature, the recognition test of the present 
investigation can be seen as having relatively little differential 
incentive for a consistent response bias (e.g., reporting old threats 
did not shorten or simplify the task, nor afford negative consequences), 
and thus may not have maximized the likelihood of assessing response 
bias distinctions that do differentiate PPD and other groups (cf., Egan 
& Clarke, 1966). 
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Other limitations of this investigation must be acknowledged. 
Chief among these is the use of a drug abuse population whose 
constituents may not reflect the effects of personality disorders in 
other samples. It is also noted that the sample comprised almost 
exclusively Black subjects, which may limit external validity. Further 
research is clearly necessary to address this issue and replicate 
findings of this study among other samples. In addition, due to 
difficulties in generating volunteer PPD subjects, the number of 
subjects studied is small. However, it is argued that the examined 
groups comprise clinically valid samples that are representative of the 
type of population for which increased knowledge relevant to theory and 
treatment of personality disorders is sorely needed. The ability to 
demonstrate statistically significant differences in the behaviors of 
small samples points to the probable magnitude and robustness of the 
observed effects. 
This study contributes to the small body of empirical findings 
describing important response differences among individuals meeting 
criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder. It represents the first 
systematic demonstration of a unique hypersensitivity to threat that is 
frequently given as a key feature of the PPD style. In addition to 
offering the potential to extend theoretical knowledge, findings may 
contribute to improved treatment and management of this condition in 
clinical settings. For example, the demonstration that PPD individuals 
may respond more strongly to a given threat but show diminished ability 
to recognize whether that threat has occurred before could have 
important clinical implications in a treatment program addressing goals 
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of improved interpersonal relations and reduced work-related aggression, 
marital dysfunction, or legal difficulties. This is particularly 
relevant for PPDs in that the latter externally-orchestrated problems 
constitute some of the most common reasons given for treatment 
self-referrals among this distrustful population (c.f., Millon, 1981). 
Such findings also may lead to enhanced understanding of the few other 
empirical results obtained from paranoid samples, e.g., Turkat, 
Phillips-Keane, and Thompson-Pope's (1987) recent demonstration of 
increased revengeful reactions to perceived social hostility among PPs. 
On the DDTU ward serving as the site of this investigation, feedback 
regarding hypersensitivity effects appears to have been helpful for 
participating inpatients, and they uniformly allowed this information to 
be shared with treatment staff. Thus, the specialized threat-related 
Stroop tasks utilized in this study may also serve as a useful 
assessment device for-therapeutic, referral or screening purposes. 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
CCMRAl IKfOB^ATION 
Identification Data Current Date Source (l nod-
•llty If 
applicable) 
f*utt entry 
Sex Race Age Birthdate Birthplace last town residence 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Marital 
status 
No. times 
narrled 
Current 
fami 1y 
No. 
household 
Raised primarily 
by 
Adopted No. 
Ves Common-1ak 
No 
Age disruption 
childhood home 
stepfather/ 
Stepmother 
Source income with* 
In childhood home: 
Wether worked 
Father worked 
Welfare 
Other 
">ge left childhood hone 
Siblings: 
Wale 
Birth order;" 
Religious preference Average monthly 
church attendance Female 
"of 
EDUCATION 
Highest grade competed 
Self 
Father 
Mother 
Failed any grades 
Reason leaving school: 
No hign school suspensions 
No high school expulsions 
Truancy: Age began _________ 
Average no. of tints per year 
Ever diagnosed hyperactive chiTJ 
Tn" 
1n 
yrs 
EMPLOYMENT 
If not currently employed, please list most recent employment and dates, where applicant. 
' I times fired Currently employed: 
Yes No 
lengthof current employment 
to 
Occupation: 
Self 
Father 
Mother 
ho. months employed lencth longest Total time employed s line fuiij 
full-time during employment (mos) (mos) employed 
past year: 
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No. jobs held 1n past year: if you have changed Jobs In 
full-tie* the past year, describe and 
Part-time list reason(s) for changefs") 
Was loss of job Income Annual income Highest legal When did you tarn 
due to alcohol lait no. legal annual Income highest income? 
or drug use? If Illegal "" 
to specify: 
MABITAL AND CH1LDBCARINS HISTORY 
I 
Current Household No. children: No. children out of wedlock 
marital composition living No. miscarriages _______ 
status decease?1"" No. abortions ________ 
Ever sexually abused ______ By who* At what age _____ 
Marriages: List each separately. 
I 2 ' 3 
Age Mrried ____________ __________ _____ 
Age separated/dlvorded • __________ _____ 
Occupation of spouse __________ __ 
Criminal record spouse __________ ____. 
Alcohol abuse by spouse ' _________ ______ 
Drug abuse by spouse . __________ __________ ______ 
No. children 
If you have lost jobs 
In the past year* des­
cribe and list reason 
ALCOHOL USE 
Aoe first Aoe first Age first teason for first Age onset 
ever drank on own time drunk alcohol use: heavy drinkir.; 
experience seeking/ 
pleasure ____^ 
social Influences ___ 
- copjng/self-medication 
Ill 
Avg no drinking Avg amount Alcoholic beverage Reason for continued 
days per week/past yr, consumed preference alcohol use 
Number mos/years Drinking pattern pleasure enhancement __ 
drinking * this period coping/medication 
4ty./day/week social Influences 
physical imperative 
Which of the following symptom clusters apply to self/family. If applicable, please 
describe symptoms'and age of first occurence. 
Symptoms Self Father Mother Siblings Other relatives Spouse/cohor; 
Drinking on 
awaken 
>g r 
ling 
Blackouts: 
number 
Benders: 
number 
Fights while 
drinking 
Think you drink 
too much 
Driving trouble: 
No. DWI arrests 
No. other traffic 
offenses 
No. accidents 
No. license 
suspensions 
Peace disturbances 
and other arrest 
while drunk: 
No. 
Medical 
Complications: 
(e.g. liver disease, 
gastritis. 
withdrawal seizures, 
polyneuropathy, etc.) 
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ALCOHOL TREATMENT HISTORY 
Mease list all previous alcohol treatment contacts for self/faRily listing dates, 
duration, type.of treatment, medications, etc. 
Treatment Self Father Hsther Siblings Other relatives Spouse/cohort 
DRUG USE 
Age first 
drug use 
First drug used use reason (jf non-
user, indicate reason) 
experience seeking/ 
pleasure 
social inTTJences 
coping/self medication 
Age first Reason (if non-use 
hard drug use Indicate reason) 
pleasure 
socia'i Influence 
soping/self 
medication 
Total mos addicted Total mos addicted other 
to opiates drugs (list) 
Support drug habit Reason for 
continued use 
Longest period of fperiods of 
complete abstinence 
Abstinence (mos) 
Explain 
Time elapsed since most 
recent drug uset, ' 
Check Items that describe 
your drug habit for past 
and explain: no pro-
bless. _____ slight pro* 
moderate 
problem. _____ severe 
problem. 
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Please indicate which of the following symptom apply to faally "embers, listing 
dates, duration, etc., where applicable. 
Symptoms Self Father Mother Siblings Other relatives Spouse/corc" 
llllelt drue use 
Illicit opiate use 
Drugs used ' 
Drug choice 
Addictfed opiates 
Addicted to other drucs 
Drug related arrests 
Pruo. Sales 
Medical complications 
(e.g., hepatitis, abs­
cesses, overdose, end-
ocarditls. etc.) 
DRUG TBC*T»»£KT HlSTQPy 
Please list all previous drug treatment contacts for self/family, listing dates, 
duration, type of treatment, medications, etc. 
Treatment Self Father Mother Siblings Other relatives 5pcuse/cohort 
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MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY 
Please list *11 previous psychiatric, psychological'mental health, etc., treatw-t 
contacts. Including inpatient, outpatient, evaluation, etc. List dates, duration, type of 
treatment, meSications, etc. 
Treatment Self Father Mother Siblings Other relatives Spouse/co»'Qft 
Medications prescribed: Major tranquiliiers Minor Tranquil tiers 
• Anticonvulsants Antidepressants 1 
ARSfSTS m PRISON CXPCB1EHCC 
Juvenile history: 
Age at £h»rge Oate Sentence Outcome 
arrest 
9 1 111 
Juvenile su*r**y: 
No. Juvenile arrest No. Juvenile convictions No. Juvenile Incarcerations Hcs incar. 
___________ ___________ ___________ cerjteJ a 
juvenile 
Juvenllle fiahts 
Adult history; 
Age it Charge Oate Sentence Outcone 
arrest 
4. 
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List any. arrests/convictions of family 
OelationtMp Charge Date Sentence totcome 
Please describe any suicide attempts..listing dates, methods, treatment required, 
follow-up psychiatric treatment, etc. 
Attempt Self father Mother Siblings Other relatives Spouse/cohort 
fAMlLV SUKWARY 
Mental Illness in mother or father Depression 
How do you know SchizophernTa" 
MUITAST BfCOR? 
Service branch Service dates 
Highest rank Rank discharge 
Discharge type Discharge reason If other 
than honorable 
Wher* served Type of duty: Combat 
Service In combat »ne 
Won combat 
MILITARY DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS 
Wo Courts/Hart1a1/conv1ct1ons Reason 
No Nonjvd1cia1/disc1p11nary actions 
No of dent ions 
No fines 
Reason 
i -
Reason 
Reason 
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7. Were there my particular circumstances or set of events that happened to you to 
trigger yo*r need or desire to drink or use drugs that time? . 
8. Ho* did the drinfclsj or druos feel? What fteltr.o did you flex tram the*? 
9. If you had to check one of the three reasons for using drugs or dnnttng the first 
tine after your period of abstinence, which one would you check? 
Negative emotions, such as depression, anger 
Social pressure from your friends or girl/boy friend, husband/wife 
_____ Enhancement of Interpersonal positive emotional states, or to have a good tfr* 
DISEASES AND SYMPTOMS. Please describe, listing dates, treatment, etc. 
Hypptens1on/hypertens1on 
Circulatory problems 
Cardiac problems 
Hepatitis/liver diseases 
Kidney disorders 
Diabetes 
Thyroid disorders 
Ulcer (G! problems, 
gastritis, etc.) 
Pancreatitis 
Respiratory problems (Pneu*. empV.) 
Siphilis - VP 
Abscess 
Se«ual dysfunction 
Weight loss/oa1n 
Head injuries 
Concussion 
Seizures 
Neurological problems 
Hyperactivity 
Physically abused/chUd 
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Injured/wounded in service (describe) Did you ever tee a ®i11tary/psychlatr1st/ 
psychologist? List type of treatment, 
duration, reason-, diagnosis, etc. 
Service connected disability. Describe injury, treatment, impairment, ___ j 
compensation, etc. 
Pattern military alcohol use 
Pattern military drug use 
marijuana 
opiates 
psychedelic* 
other drugs 
Wo. of military awards 
Contat exposure 
In service 1965*7$ yes no Responsible for death of enemy military 
yes no 
Stationed in VietNam yes no Wounded 1n combat yes__ no 
Saw Injury or death of 
U.S. serviceman yes no Responsible for death of enemy civilians 
yes no 
Fired weapor./flred upon 
1n combat yes no Served third tour of duty 1n Viet Nam 
yes no 
p»i'6 Rftaosr osscsstnt 
1. Please give the date and time of your first relapse episode* or the first time you 
used alcohol or tfrogs after your hospital release. " 
71 When you toofc your first flnnn. or consumed drugs, we situation was 
T. Where were vou? 
4. Who were you with? 
5. How much did you drinfc. or about how nu;h drucs did you me? 
6. What would you say the main reason was for taking that first drink or using drugs? ~ 
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This form contains * list of wards. Some of these words appeared on the 
colored cards you have already seen—these are old words. The other 
words, are new words that you have not been shown before. For each word 
on this form, please circle "old" if you think the word appeared before 
on one of the colored cards* or "new" if you think the word did not 
appear on the cards. Also* please rate your confidence about whether 
each word is old or new <that is» how certain you are about each 
decision)« by circling "1", "2"» or "3" as follows: 
1 * little confidence; 2 * some confidences 3 = much confidence. 
Please circle either "old" or "new" and rate your confidence <1>2> or 
3) for every word. Thanks. 
CIVILIZED Old New 1 2 3 MERRY Old New 1 2 3 
INADEQUATE Old New 1 2 3 CLEVERNESS Old New 1 2 3 
ALERT Old New • 1 2 3 MILLIONAIRE Old New 1 2 3 
OUTWITTED Old New 1 2 3 
PRODIGIOUS Old New 1 2 3 
ADVENTUROUS Old New 1 2 3 
INTELLIGENT Old New 1 2 3 STRENUOUS Old New 1 S 3 
TENTH Old New 1 2 3 
CONTAGIOUS Old New 1 2 3 
PATHETIC Old New 1 2 3 
LITTERED Old New 1 2 3 
HATED Old New 1 2 3 
BATTLES Old New I 2 3 
HANDSOME Old New 1 2 3 
PHOTOGRAPHED Old New 1 2 3 
DAMAGING Old New 1 2 3 
PAINSTAKING Old New 1 2 3 
AUTOMATED Old New 1 2 3 
ABBREVIATED Old New 1 2 3 
EXCITEMENT Old New 1 2 3 
CAPABLE Old New 1 2 3 
ARTIFICIAL Old New 1 2 3 
ACTIVE Old New I 2 3 
TUNNEL Old New 1 2 3 
CHEATING Old New 1 2 3 
BONUS Old New I 2 3 
ACTIVITIES Old New 1 2 3 
COOPERATIVE Old New I 2 3 
PADDLE Old New 1 2 3 
FRIENDLY Old New 1 2 3 
RETIRED Old New 1 2 3 
WORKMEN Old New 1 2 3 
LASTED Old New 1 2 3 
TROPICAL Old New 1 2 3 
SPECIFIED Old New 1 2 3 
ENTERTAINED Old New 1 2 3 
DEPENDABLE Old New 1 2 3 
UNINTELLIGENT Old New 1 2 3 
PATTED Old New 1 2 3 i 
BUTTONED Old New 1 2 3 
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TRIUMPHANT Old New 1 3 3 BOTHER Old New 1 3 3 
MAINTAINING Old New 1 3 3 ABROAD Old New 1 3 3 
MOUNTED Old New 1 3 3 TRADED Old New 1 3 3 
SNEAKED Old New 1 3 3 FLOWING Old New 1 3 3 
SHALLOW Old New 1 3 3 AROUSED Old New 1 3 3 
COOLNESS Old New 1 3 3 TRICKED Old New 1 3 3 
DRIPPED Old New 1 8 3 CONDENSED Old New 1 3 3 
FROZEN Old New 1 3 3 EMBROIDERED Old New 1 3 3 
THREATEN Old New 1 3 3 EXCLUSIVE Old New 1 
/ 
3 3 
HEALTHY Old New 1 3 3 
9 
BETRAYED Old New 1 3 3 
CLATTERING Old New 1 3 3 PORTABLE Old New 1 3 3 
VERSATILE Old New 1 3 3 EXPRESSION Old New 1 3 3 
MISTAKES Old New 1 3 3 INTERMEDIATE Old New 1 3 3 
SQUATTING Old New 1 3 3 FAILURE Old New 1 3 3 
INFERIOR Old New 1 3 3 RIDICULES Old New 1 3 3 
LONELY Old New 1 3 3 DELAYED Old New 1 3 3 
THREATENING Old New 1 3 3 TEMPTING Old New 1 3 3 
DORMANT Old New 1 3 3 REASONED Old New 1 3 3 
REALISTIC Old New 1 3 ' 3 OLDEST Old New 1 3 3 
FORCED Old New 1 3 3 
ASSORTED Old New 1 3 3 
CRITICIZED Old New 1 3 3 
FEATURE Old New 1 3 3 
FOOLISH Old New 1 2 3 
PRESSED Old New 1 3 3 
LOUNGING Old New 1 ' 3 3 
SCRAMBLED Old New 1 3 3 
STUPID Old New 1 3 3 
GEOGRAPHICAL Old New 1 3 3 
WINNER Old New 1 3 3 
CONSIDERATE Old New 1 3 3 
RUINED Old New 1 3 3 
PILGRIMS Old New 1 3 3 
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OTThCHME'iT TC VA FORM 10-1036: INFORMED CONSENT -SfiEEMEMT 
!• . • do hereby consent tc carticipate 
research investigation conducted to examine tne nature of huntr, pe-ce 
and personal i ty. 1 nave been informed that the project m«v ->ct benef 
directly but that it is hopetj that it will increase our under stand i n 
human behavior and thereby benefit me indirectly. 
Dr. rialot* or his associates have explained to me tne details and re 
for this study. 1 am aware that 1 Mill be asked to divulge pe-M 
information. I have been informed that all information receivec f-| 
will be kept confidential and at no time will any of mv r»r;i 
responses be associated with my name. Further, I have been info^<-:ect| 
the following coding system will be employed to ensure confidentla 1;t. 
Each participant will be assigned a subject number which- w: 
recorded on the Informed Consent Agreements. All records pertain;-
subject responses to survey questions or forms will be identifier 
filed by number only. Informed. Consent Agreements ard ide-'t;-
information will be stored and locked in a separate master fii?. 
master file will be located in a different site than the "d : 
which will contain non-personal identity information. 
Dr. Ma low or his associates have explained to me the nature of r 
used in th:s study. I have also observed samples of the t:;nuiys < 
used in this studv» and have had these described to me. » 
Risks/Discomfort: Tnere is only minimal risk or discomfort in.cl; 
collection of individual perceptual data. 1 do understand tr.at :cs« 
fatigue and some anxiety due to personal disclosure cgjU' t'CCar • 
answering questionaires. 
1 have been informed and fully understand the procedures ane 
this investigation. 1 voluntarily agree to participate. 1 rf'.tos. 
Tulane University School of Medicine and its agerc.es •frc-
ressor.sibi 1 i tv or liability relating tc my participation. 
!n case of any adverse effect or physical injury resu';ti.-.o 
study> eligible vete-ans are entitled to medical ca-e and '.rs&tr 
Condensation may be pavable under Title 36 USC 35 i o* ;n 
c i r cums tances under the Federal Tort Claims Act. No<—e l i g i b l e  . - e ? <  
or nnn-vctcans are entitled only to medical emerge-.cv c*"«? 
treatment on a hu«anitirian basis. Compensation would be limi-c 
situations involving negligence and would be ccntr?2 1ed t. 
provisions of t.he Federal To'-t Claims Act. 
I also unde-stana that I air. free to withdraw my ccnser.t i.nd dis * 
pa-ticlpation at any time. 
Uitneis Signature 
O a t  e  
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PART I-AOREEMEMT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
BY OR UNOER THE DIRECTION OP THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 
I. It M • MMT 
(Tift • frim mil 
&t*TK>m».PS Pk?<o/M£,7y ia tfi* i*vnuia«» eatr>ed 
m<r«w 
p£ZC£r*TtJ/lt PZoC*SS£<> "I .'nzx.TMC/r USf 
2. I hi«* alpted on* or sort jnfarattioe dietta with tfek tttk to dw* that I km raad tb* darrlptlna acnauic tat papoa tad nature of uu 
wmtiption, Iht procedure to k* uaed, the nika, Inmnaoiilciw. rid* efbcta and banefita to to a^actad, at «•> a otto coona of action oper. to me 
and ay rtahttowttMraw froathe tmetiptionaany ttac. Eachof thaaettaaahaabcaaaaytatoedtoaoby the lti»a*1piuna the itaaonot a wiumu 
Th* inroatuHat hat aptwered ay qoattiona concerning Iht imtrtgtUoa and I balieeo I —dawd trtollt hdendcd 
J. I undantand that no fuarantaa or tauiuoalim been tfeen aeaiac* th* leauNi aadrieka of aa Inmtigatloo moot alnytknown beforehand I 
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APPENDIX D 
SUBJECT INSTRUCTIONS: COLOR NAMING TASKS 
Instructions: Color-Naming Tasks 
In this task you are going to be looking at some words that are 
printed on cards in four different colors of ink: RED, BLUE, GREEN, 
and ORANGE. All you have to do is name the word colors—that is, the 
color of the ink that they're printed in—out loud to ne as quickly as 
you can. Don't worry about what the words say, just tell me the 
colors. Start at the top and work across In rows as fast as possible. 
On the first card, the "words" are just zeroes. Instructions are 
exactly the same for each of the cards—just name the Ink color of 
each word as fast as possible. 
APPENDIX E 
RECORDING FORM 
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StroOP 
Name: 
Card I 
Card 2 
Card 3 
Card <• 
Card 5 
Card 6 
Date: 
Time (sees) 
(000000) 
(Red) 
Ti PI 
T2 PS 
T1 PI 
TS PS 
xaminer: 
APPENDIX F 
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
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Debrief:ng Statement 
The purpose of the present research is to further our understandsng of 
certain personalltv styies among residents of the substance dependence 
treatment units. to some extent all inaividuals 'possess personality 
characteristics* and we are interested in the characteristics which coula 
be described as "being cautious in nature"* and those which could be 
described .as "being pleasure-seeling". Little is known about how sum 
personality styles effect perception as in the tasks you completed. The 
results of testing and interviews you have completed on the Unit suggest 
that you may (HERE INSERT EITHER be cautious OR be pleasure-seeking) ov 
nature. 
Me expected that in tasks such as the ones you have completed* more 
cautious individuals may respond differently in the way they perceive the 
different items we included. For example* such individuals might be more 
distracted by negative or threatening words in the color-naming task. On 
the other hand* pleasure-seeking individuals might be more distracted and 
take longer with more positive words. We also expect that different people 
might remember .positive or negative words more easily* even when they are 
not expecting to have to remember them. In summary* what is beir.g 
attempted is to increase our knowledge about the relationship between 
certain personality characteristics* and styles of responding to various 
types of information. In the long run* we hope that this mav enable us to 
offer more Effective feedbacfc and treatment. 
We appreciate your helping with this project. and will be happv to 
answer any Questions. Thank you. 
APPENDIX G 
RESPONSE BIAS INDICES ACROSS WORD TYPES BY GROUP 
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NPG Words 
NPD APD PPD 
Criterion B1 B1 B1 
6 .0000 .2430 .1768 
5 -.0026 .1139 .0437 
4 -.0048 .1061 .0078 
3 .0367 -.0034 .0106 
2 .1340 -.0200 .2459 
Pairwise Comparison 
t (4) 
NPD/APD 0.3587 ns 
APD/PPD 0.0602 ns 
NPD/PPD 0.7959 ns 
PG Words 
NPD APD PPD 
Criterion 5' B1 B1 
6 .1684 .0803 .0457 
5 -.0200 -.0800 -.0457 
4 -.1628 -.1117 -.0821 
3 -.2519 -.1717 -.2462 
2 -.3455 -.1896 -.7641 
Pairwise Comparison 
t (4) 
NPD/APD 0.2752 ns 
APD/PPD 0.4842 ns 
NPD/PPD 0.4942 ns 
Note. NPD = Non-personality-disorder. APD = Antisocial Personality 
Disorder. PPD = Paranoid Personality Disorder. 
NPG = non-positive/gratification. PG = positive/gratification. NT = 
non-threat. T = threat. 
132 
NT Words 
NPD APD PPD 
Criterion Ml 
6 .1598 .1491 .2587 
5 .0958 .1305 .0756 
4 .0126 .1102 .0573 
3 -.1700 -.0109 -.1329 
2 -.3070 .0000 -.3652 
Pairwise Comparison • 
t (4) 
NPD/APD o" .9492 ns 
APD/PPD 0 .5628 ns 
NPD/PPD 0 .3361 ns 
T Words 
NPD APD PPD 
.Criterion BJ_ 
6 .1823 .1069 .0486 
5 .0769 -.0437 .0009 
4 -.1089 -.0561 -.0037 
3 -.2784 -.1290 -.0248 
2 -.3472 -.2903 -.3204 
Pairwise Comparison 
t (4) 
NPD/APD 0. 1154 ns 
APD/PPD 0. 3425 ns 
NPD/PPD 0. 2299 ns 
Note. NPD = Non-personality-disorder. APD = Antisocial Personality 
Disorder. PPD = Paranoid Personality Disorder. 
NPG = non-positive/gratification. PG = positive/gratification. NT = 
non-threat. T = threat. 
